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Kentucky Adopts the Uniform Partnership Act
By Wu.LnBuT D. HIAm*
The dominant position assumed by the corporation in modem
American business life has tended to obscure the fact that the
partnership is still in widespread use as a form of business
organization in this country.' While the carrying on of any sort
of large scale interstate business activity almost of necessity calls
for use of the corporate device, the partnership remains the
frequent choice in the small closely held enterprise where the
scope of business activity is of a more limited and restricted
nature.2 It is not without significance, therefore, to the bench
and bar of the Commonwealth of Kentucky that the General As-
sembly, during its 1954 session, enacted the Uniform Partnership
Act3
By this action Kentucky added itself to the growing list of
states that have found it desirable to make this particular Uni-
form Act a part of their statute law. At the end of the year
1953, thirty-two states had adopted the Act, including the seven
states bordering Kentucky. In this latter group, Illinois and Ten-
nessee had adopted the Act in 1917, Virginia in 1918, Missouri
and Ohio in 1949, Indiana in 1950,1 and West Virginia in 1953.
It is thus not surprising to find Kentucky joining the ranks of its
sister states in becoming one of the now clear majority of states
that have enacted this legislation. 5
* B.S., LL.B., University of Illinois; LL.M., Harvard University. Member of
Illinois and Kentucky Bars. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.For an interesting and instructive study of the modem private business cor-
poration, see BERE Am MEANS, TnE MODERN CoRPoRATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
EnTY (1932).
An excellent survey of the factors to be considered by the lawyer in helping
his clients choose the form of business organization best suited to their needs wil
be found in SARNiE, ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF SMALL BusnEssEs (1951).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.150 to 362.360 (Supp. 1954). The Act became effective
in Kentucky on June 17, 1954.
'The Act was passed by the Indiana legislature in 1949, but its effective date
was January 1, 1950. See Table of States Wherein Act Has Been Adopted in 7
U.L.A., 1953 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part.
" It is interesting to note the renewed interest in this particular Uniform Act
in recent years. When the State of Washington adopted the Act in 1945, this
brought the list of state adoptions to twenty-four, exactly one-half of the states.
No further adoptions occured until 1947. During the period 1947-1953, eight
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The Uniform Partnership Act first made its appearance in
1914, when it was approved for adoption by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, after some
twelve years of painstaking work by its Committee on Com-
mercial Law." In the drafting of the Act, the intent was not to
revolutionize the law of partnership by creating a completely
new set of principles, but rather to bring together in one unified
statute the basic common law conceptions of partnership along
with such modifications and additions as were deemed necessary
or desirable to achieve the desired uniformity among the states
in this important area of commercial law.7
There were other advantages, however, in addition to that
of uniformity, which the Commissioners believed would result
from adoption by the states of a general statute covering the
law of partnership. In certain areas of partnership law, particu-
larly those related to partnership property, it was found that the
common law had failed to develop any consistent legal theory,
with the result that theory and practice were many times hope-
lessly confused. It was also found that in some areas of partner-
ship affairs judicial treatment was so infrequent as to provide no
adequate guide for business men and their legal advisors. It was
believed that adoption of the Act by the states would reduce
these uncertainties and fill these gaps, thereby bringing about
improvement in the practical administration of the law of partner-
ship.8
These were the considerations which, forty years ago,
prompted the drafting of the Act. Its adoption by such a large
group of states since that time has served to confirm the belief
states adopted the Act. They were: Delaware (1947), Indiana (1950), Missouri
(1949), Montana (1947), New Mexico (1947), Ohio (1949), South Carolina
(1950), and West Virginia (1953). The Executive Secretary of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws advised under date of
October 1, 1954, that Arizona has also adopted the Act during 1954. This, along
with Kentucky, brings the total of state adoptions to thirty-four. It has been sug-
gested that an increased use of the partnership form of business because of heavy
corporate taxes during World War II may have caused the revival of interest in
the Act. See Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law and The Uniform
Partnership Act, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 616, 617 n. 11 (1948).
'A more detailed account of the drafting of the Act will be found in 7 U.L.A.,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note. See also Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act,
24 YALE L.J. 617 (1915).
See Lichtenberger, The Uniform Partnership Act, 63 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 639(1915).87 U.L.A., Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
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held by the Commissioners that a real need and justification
existed for the preparation of such a statute. The Act has now
achieved a respectable maturity and there exists a substantial and
growing body of judicial precedent interpreting and applying its
provisions. Moreover, the widespread adoption of the Act by
the states has served to intensify its importance in the develop-
ment and unification of this phase of our commercial law.
Now that Kentucky is numbered among those states whose
law of partnership is governed by this Act, the natural question
which presents itself is the effect passage of the Act will have
on existing partnership law in Kentucky. This article has been
prepared in the hope that a general survey of the Act in relation
to existing law might prove helpful. Needless to say, no attempt
will be made to deal exhaustively with the law of partnership at
common law, in Kentucky, or under the Act. This must be
reserved for general treatises on the subject. The effort here
will be to indicate in a general way the areas of existing partner-
ship law most affected or influenced by the Act and some of the
more important changes the Act makes, or may make, in the
present law of partnership in Kentucky.
Legal problems involving a partnership have tended to group
themselves around three distinct phases of partnership life: (1)
those incident to the creation of the partnership, (2) those aris-
ing as incident to the partnership as a going concern, and (3)
those concerned with the dissolution and termination of the
partnership. The discussion which follows, therefore, will be
broken down into these three categories, with the exception of
problems relating to partnership property, which, because of
their tendency to cut across all three of the categories and the
special treatment given them by the Act, will be discussed
separately.
CREATION OF THE PARTNERsHP RELATION
1. Definition of Partnership-Tests and Indicia of the Relation.
One of the more frequent questions that has been presented
to the courts in the law of partnership is whether a particular
" The cases are conveniently collected and arranged under the appropriate
sections of the Act in 7 U.L.A., which is kept up to date by cumulative annual
pocket parts.
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business arrangement constitutes a partnership. Many attempts
at defining a partnership have been made by courts and text-
writers, a task which has proven surprising difficult;10 but the
definitions, while differing somewhat in verbiage, will be found
to bear a remarkable similarity."- They all tend to stress, in one
way or another, the necessity that parties share the profits of a
business as joint owners. In Marshall v. Bennett,12 the Kentucky
court adopted the following definition:
A partnership is a status arising out of a contract
entered into by two or more persons whereby they agree to
share, as common owners, the profits of a business carried
on by all or any of them on behalf of all of them . (Citing
Shumaker on Partnership, 2nd Ed., p. 2)13
Except for the reference to partnership as a status, this defini-
tion closely parallels the one contained in Section 6 of the Uni-
form Partnership Act 4 which reads as follows:
A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.
It will be observed that neither of these definitions refers to
the necessity that losses as well as profits be shared. Some of
the common law definitions, however, do speak of the sharing of
losses as well as profits, 5 and the Kentucky court itself has
remarked that the partnership relation "contemplates the sharing
of profits and the expressed or implied agreement to bear losses." 6
" See, e.g., Stone v. Turfmens Supply Co., 103 Ky. 318, 323, 45 S.W. 78, 80
(1898) in which the court said: "It is exceedingly difficult to lay down an absolute
rule for the determination of the existence of a partnership."
' See the definitions collected in MECHEM, PRuN~iims'm sec. 1 (2d ed. 1920).
"214 Ky. 328, 283 S.W. 115 (1926).
"Id. at 831, 283 S.W. at 116. This definition was also adopted in Guthrie v.
Foster, 256 Ky. 753, 755, 76 S.W. 2d 927, 929 (1934), and by reference to
Marshall v. Bennett, supra in Pearl Bowling & Co. v. Hensley & Hensley, 259 Ky.
651, 653, 83 S.W. 2d 31, 32 (1935) and Harmount & Woolf Tie Co. v. Baker,
251 Ky. 795, 798, 66 S.W. 2d 45, 47 (1933).
"Ky. Rtv. STAT. 362.175 (Supp. 1954).
See, e.g., Crider v. Providence Coal Mining Company, 242 Ky. 514, 516,
46 S.W. 2d 1072 (1932) where, after reciting that some conflict had arisen among
the authorities as to the true test of the partnership relation, the court said: "In
general, it has been understood to mean a contract between two or more com-
petent persons to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them,
in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the profits and bear the losses in
certain fixed proportions." This definition can be traced to Chancellor Kent (3
KENT'S COMMENTAmIs 23) whose definition has proven a popular one with the
courts at common law. It was adopted recently by the Kentucky court from the
Crider case, supra in Shelley v. Hill, 265 S.W. 2d 34, 36 (Ky. 1953).
"Frank v. Thompson, 207 Ky. 335, 338, 269 S.W. 295, 296 (1924). See
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This is no doubt, in general, an accurate observation since parties
who share profits as co-owners in a business venture will more
than likely also agree to share the losses or will be deemed by the
law to have so agreed in the absence of any indication of a con-
trary intention.17 However, it has been pointed out that a partner-
ship can exist even though there is an agreement for indemnifica-
tion of one or more of the partners against loss.' 8 Thus, sharing
of losses, at least as between the partners themselves, does not
seem to be an indispensable element where a partnership other-
wise clearly exists. 9 The definition contained in the Act by omit-
ting reference to sharing of losses protects against the possibility
that undue emphasis will be placed on this factor.20
Common to all definitions, including that in the Uniform
Partnership Act, is the notion that partnership is the result of a
voluntary act whereby the parties have associated themselves
together for the purpose of carrying on a business.2' Funda-
mentally, then, the question is whether the parties have intended
to form a partnership, and the importance of intention as a test
for finding the existence of a partnership has been frequently
stressed in the Kentucky decisions. 2  It is agreed, however, that
the question is not what the parties have called their relation,
but whether by their agreements and actions they show an intent
to create the legal relationship which the law recognizes as
constituting a partnership.23
also the recent case of Drummy v. Stem, 269 S.W. 2d 198 (Ky. 1954) in which
the court concluded that a joint venture had not been created under a building
contract since there was no express provision for the sharing of losses and none
could be implied. The court said that as to both the partnership relation and that
of joint adventure, it is necessary that there be a sharing of the profits and losses.
'See MEcHEm, P.RNvmisam sec. 78 (2d ed. 1920).
' Id. at sec. 81.
Ibid. Nevertheless, absence of loss sharing may be of significance, when
coupled with other factors, in leading to the conclusion that a partnership does not
exist. See, e.g., Roy C. Whayne Supply Company v. McGowan, 213 Ky. 102, 280
S.W. 491 (1926).
" "The presence of an agreement to share losses will increase the prospect of
partnership, its absence will lessen it. However, the idea of the sharing of losses
as indispensable needs to be deflated." Karesh, Partnership Law And The Uniform
Partnership Act In South Carolina, 3 So. CAR. L.Q. 193, 228 (1950).
'In their note to Section 6 of the Act the Commissioners stated: "It is not
indicated that the association must be a voluntary one. In the domain of private
law the term association necessarily involves the idea that the association is vol-
untary." 7 U.L.A. 11, 12 (1949).
uSee, e.g., Marshall v. Bennett, 214 Ky. 328, 831, 283 S.W. 115, 116 (1926);
Roy C. Whayne Supply Company v. McGowan, 213 Ky. 102, 109, 280 S.W. 491,
493 (1926).
" Crawford v. Wiedemann, 159 Ky. 18, 23, 166 S.W. 595, 597 (1914);
Marshall v. Bennett, supra note 22.
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In the eyes of the law, profit-sharing is undoubtedly the most
important single factor indicating that parties intend to carry
on business as partners. Indeed, at one time in England, profit-
sharing was considered as constituting conclusive evidence that
a partnership existed as to third persons, even though no partner-
ship in fact existed as between the parties.24 In 1860, the English
House of Lords reconsidered this doctrine, and in the well-known
case of Cox v. Hickman,25 rejected the position that a sharing in
the profits of an enterprise was necessarily conclusive that the
parties were partners, even as to third persons. Lord Cranworth
stated that the true test for partnership liability should be
whether the person sought to be charged was in the position of
principal as to those carrying on the trade, and that participation
in profits would afford cogent, often conclusive, evidence that
the trade was being carried on in part for him or on his behalf
as principal. 26 Under this view, which has been generally fol-
lowed in the United States as well as England, there must be
added to the element of sharing profits the further evidence that
the parties shared such profits as principal proprietors in the
business and not in some other relation. The Kentucky court
summarized the test as follows in Boreing v. Wilson:
28
But, however great the diversity of opinion among the
courts, the law is well settled that where the parties, by
their acts, conduct, and writings show that they intended
a partnership, and did in fact agree to share the profits of
the business as joint owners, such parties are partners.
(Emphasis supplied)29
The Uniform Partnership Act recognizes this test by the re-
quirement in its definition that profits be shared by the parties as
"co-owners." 30
Under this test, profit-sharing remains as the strongest single
The leading case was Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. B1. 285, 126 Eng. Rep. 525
(1793) in which two merchants operating separate businesses agreed to pool and
share their respective earnings. See CiANE, PAI SaTNEs sec. 14 (2d ed. 1952);
MECiEM, PARmTEsI-I sec. 86, 87 (2d ed. 1920).
"8 H.L. Cas. 268 (1860), 11 Eng. Rep. 431.
Id. at 306, 11 Eng. Rep. at 446-447.
MEcHEM, PARTNFRasIm sec. 77 (2d ed. 1920).
128 Ky. 570, 108 S.W. 914 (1908).
"Id. at 596-597, 108 S.W. at 922.
"In the Commissioners Note to Section 6 it is said: "Ownership involves the
power of ultimate control. To state that partners are co-owners of a business is to
state that they each have the power of ultimate control." 7 U.L.A. 11, 12 (1949).
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indication that the parties are "joint owners" or "co-owners" of
the business. Lord Cranworth recognized this when he said
participation in profits afforded "cogent" evidence that a partner-
ship relation existed,31 the Kentucky court recognized it in Bore-
ing v. Wilson when it stated that while profit-sharing is not a con-
clusive test of partnership, it is still "an important consideration
as an item of evidence tending to prove" the relation,32 and it is
recognized in the Uniform Partnership Act by the provision in
Section 7(4)3' that the "receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner." 4
Under certain more or less well-defined situations, however,
the inference arising from profit-sharing is not drawn. They are
listed in Section 7(4) of the Act33 as receipt by a person of profits
in payment of a debt, as wages of an employee or rent to a land-
lord, as an annuity to a deceased partner's widow or representa-
tive, as interest on a loan, and as consideration for the sale of
good will of a business or other property. These are all situations
in which the sharing of profits is on a basis other than that of
co-owners, and the inference which would otherwise arise from
the sharing of profits is, therefore, effectually rebutted. Counter-
parts of some, if not all, these situations will be found in the
existing case law of Kentucky, particularly with reference to the
receipt of profits as interest on a loan 36 and as payment for serv-
ices as an employee.3 7
In general, then, it may be said that in this area of partner-
ship law the.Act attempts no change, but merely seeks to bring
into somewhat sharper focus principles already well established.
See note 26 supra.
"128 Ky. 570, 595, 108 S.W. 914, 922 (1908).
'KY. BEv. STAT. 362.180(4) (Supp. 1954).
"The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership. Sec-
tion 7(3) of the Act so provides. Ky. 1REv. STAT. 362.180(3) (Supp. 1954). This
was also recognized recently by the Kentucky court in Shelley v. Hill, 265 S.W.
2d 34 (Ky. 1953). Likewise, both at common law and under the Act, joint own-
ership of property does not of itself establish a partnership, whether the co-owners
share in any profits made by the use of the property or not. See Section 7(2) of
the Act; Ky. REv. STAT. 362.180(2) (Supp. 1954). And see the following Ken-
tucky cases: Ford v. Jellico Grocery Company, 194 Ky. 552, 240 S.W. 65 (1922);
Crider v. Providence Coal Mining Company, 242 Ky. 514, 46 S.W. 2d 1072
(1932).
'See note 33 supra.
3' The leading case appears to be Edwards v. Johnson, 219 Ky. 113, 292 S.W.
750 (1927), which contains a good discussion of the proposition.
"'See, e.g., Blackerby v. Oder, 201 Ky. 403, 257 S.W. 43 (1923). But cf.
Jewell v. Janes, 238 Ky. 63, 36 S.W. 2d 875 (1931).
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2. Partnership by Estoppel.
After the decision in Cox v. Hickman, it was clear that part-
nership liability to third persons was to depend primarily upon
the existence of a partnership in fact between the parties.38 How-
ever, it .was also recognized at common law,39 as well as in Sec-
tion 16 of the Act,40 that a person may come under a partnership
liability to third persons by having held himself out, or having
consented to his being held out, as a partner on which third
persons have relied. In other words, there is recognition that
the principle of equitable estoppel may serve as a basis for
partnership liability. The cases at common law, however, dif-
fered over whether this estoppel should be applied against a per-
son who had knowledge that he was being held out as a partner,
and who was not otherwise active in creating the appearance, but
who failed to adopt affirmative measures to refute the representa-
tion.4' One line of cases adopted the position that there was no
duty to deny such representations. Another group adopted the
position that such a duty existed, the duty to be measured by the
steps an ordinarily prudent person would take under similar cir-
cumstances to manifest his refusal. The Kentucky Court adopted
this latter position in E. L. Martin & Co. v. A. B. Maggard &
Son,42 holding a father liable for debts contracted by his son
where he knew the son was carrying on a store business in the
joint names of both as partners.
The rule of estoppel is stated in Section 16 of the Act43 in the
following language:
When a person, by words spoken or written or
by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another
representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing
partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners,
he is liable to any such person to whom such representation
has been made, who has, on the faith of such representation
given credit to the actual or apparent partnership....
The Commissioners, as well as the draftsman, have stated that
this provision was designed to remove the existing conflict
" Stone v. Turfinen's Supply Co., 103 Ky. 318, 45 S.W. 78 (1898).
"Green, Huffaker & Co. v. Taylor & Son, 98 Ky. 330, 32 S.W. 945 (1895).
"Ky. BEv. STAT. 362.225 (Supp. 1954).
' C ANE, PARTNERSHM sec. 86 (2d ed. 1952).
"206 Ky. 558, 267 S.W. 1102 (1925).
"See note 40 supra.
UNmiOFoi PARTNERSHiP Acr
by imposing liability only where there was a consent in fact to
the holding out.44 Accordingly, the Act would seem to reject the
broad basis on which the Kentucky case was decided, since the
implication from it, and like cases, is that mere knowledge is
enough in all cases to show consent unless affirmative steps have
been taken to deny the representations.
On the other hand, the Act does not seem to go so far as to
require the position that denial is never necessary where mere
knowledge is involved. The language of the Act is that the repre-
sentation shall have been by "words spoken or written or by
conduct." It is well recognized in the law of contracts and
agency that under certain circumstances silence and inaction
may give rise to consent.45 Conduct can be negative as well as
positive. Therefore, it would seem permissible under the Act to
say that failure to contradict under some circumstances may be
evidence from which a finding of fact could properly be made
that consent to the holding out actually existed.46 Indeed, it is
believed that the facts of the E. L. Martin & Co. case itself
suggest the existence of such a possibility, although it is true the
father did say that he had told his son that he would bring suit
against him if he bought any more goods in his name.
The Act provides that partnership liability through estoppel
results only where all the members of an existing partnership
consent to the representation and that where there is no existing
partnership or less than all the partners in an existing partner-
ship have consented to the representation, the liability is a joint
obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting.47
The attempt here seems to have been to make certain that where
there is no partnership in fact between all parties involved, a
court will not mistakenly, through calling the obligation a partner-
"Commissioners' note to Section 16, 7 U.L.A. 94, 95 (1949); Lewis, The
Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. 3. 617, 625 (1915).
"WILLISTON, CONTRACTS sec. 91 (Rev. Ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
sec. 94 (1933).
" See Note, 6 MD. L. REv. 337 (1942), wherein this suggestion was made
with reference to a similar problem which has arisen in the Maryland case law
since the passage of the Act in that state. But see BuRDICK, PARTNERSHIP, 72-73
(3d ed. 1917) in which he says as to Section 16 of the Act: "If this be compared
with the corresponding provision of the British Act, it will be noticed that it re-
quires proof of actual consent by the defendant to the holding out, while the Brit-
ish Act requires proof only of the fact that he has suffered himself to be held out.
Under the latter rule affirmative actiori repudiating the representation is necessary
at times. Under the former, it is not."
"Section 16(1) (b) and (2); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.225(1) (b) and (2).
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ship obligation, apply in the event of insolvency the ordinary
partnership rule as to priority of joint creditors in joint property
and of separate creditors in separate property.48
8. Partnership as a Legal Entity.
Where a partnership in fact has been created, it has not always
been clear whether the law should treat the resulting business
unit as a mere aggregate of the individuals who compose it or
whether it should be personified and treated as a separate entity
distinct from its members similar to the position adopted as to
the corporation.49 The business man, unhampered by the legal
concepts which constantly influence the thinking of the lawyer
and judge, has had no difficulty in conceiving of the "firm" as
being something distinct from the members, particularly in the
setting up and keeping of the firm accounts with the individual
members. 50 Moreover, courts have on occasion found it expedient
to refer to the enterprise an an entity, although in most instances
the result reached would have been the same regardless of the
description used."' The common law, however, for the most part
rejected the entity or "mercantile" theory and adopted the posi-
tion that partnership activities were to be regarded as those of
the partners and not as those of the partnership as a separate
legal unit.52 This lack of receptiveness to the mercantile or entity
4
aSee Commissioners' Note to Section 16, 7 U.L.A. 94, 95 (1949); CRANE,
PAwRTNEsmr' sec. 86 (2d ed. 1952); Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law
and The Uniform Partnership Act, 9 OMo ST. L. J. 616, 622 (1948).
"CRANE, PARTNERsaI sec. 3 (2d ed. 1952); MEcHEm, PAnTNERsHIP sec. 6
(2d ed. 1920).
r'See MEmcHM, PARTNERsHI sec. 7 (2d ed. 1920).
Two Kentucky decisions will serve to illustrate how a court may buttress its
decision by reference to the partnership as an entity. In Duquesne Distributing
Co. v. Greenbaum, 135 Ky. 182, 187, 121 S.W. 1026, 1028 (1909), the court, in
considering the extent of liability of a partnership for slander uttered by an agent
of the firm, said: "A partnership in so far as its liability for the slanderous utter-
ances of an agent or servant is concerned stands on the same footing as a corpora-
tion. A partnership is a legal entity as well as a corporation, except in a more
limited sense. The firm as well as the corporation may have agents, and be liable
for their acts of commission and omission in all states of case that a corporation
would be liable." In Bemiss v. Widows' & Orphans' Home of the Christian Church
of Kentucky, 191 Ky. 316, 320, 230 S.W. 310, 312 (1921), the court, in eaking
of the general rule denying a partner compensation for his services, said: "The
reason for the rule lies in the fact that each partner in taking care of the partner-
ship property and in managing and conducting the business is taking care of his
own interest and is performing his own duties and obligations growing out of the
partnership relation, since the partnership is considered an entity of which each
partner forms a part." See the interesting critique on the Greenbaum case in
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply, 29 HAnv. L. tw. 158, 175 n. 26
(1915).
See note 49 supra.
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theory was no doubt encouraged by the traditional common law
attitude that recognition of group entities must come through
special dispensation of the sovereign, which in this country would
mean through legislative action.' 3 So, when thought turned to
the drafting of a partnership act, concern arose as to whether the
act should preserve the traditional common law position or
whether the occasion had now presented itself for introducing
into legal theory the mercantile understanding of the partner-
ship. We are told that one reason for the extended time of
twelve years taken in the drafting of the Act was the inability to
solve the fundamental question as to the general theory on which
the Act should be drafted. 4 The decision was ultimately made
that it be drafted on the common law or aggregate theory.55
However, modifications in the aggregate theory were authorized
with ,espect to the ownership of partnership property, and these,
as well as other provisions of the Act, will be found to be con-
sistent with the legal entity concept.56
TEE GomI CONCERN
1. Partnership Contract Liability.
Partnership law, as related to the conduct of the business by
the partners, is in large part an application of the law of contracts,
torts, and agency, particularly the latter. In transacting business
the partners are in the position of agents. They are sometimes
referred to as agents of each other,57 a mode of statement con-
sistent with the aggregate theory of the nature of the partnership
relation; at other times, they are referred to as agents of the firm
for the transaction of its business,58 a mode of statement consistent
with the entity view of the partnership. The manner of statement,
'See CRu, PAnmT'a nsa sec. 3 (2d ed. 1952).
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J. 617, 639 (1915).
t 7 U.L.A., Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
An extended discussion took place between Professor Crane and Dean Lewis
shortly after the Act was approved for adoption over the extent to which its pro-
visions departed from the common law aggregate theory. See Crane, The Uniform
Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REv. 762 (1915); Lewis, The Uniform
Partnership Act-A Reply, 29 HAv. L. REv. 158, 291 (1915-1916); Crane, The
Uniform Partnership Act And Legal Persons, 29 HAnv. L. REv. 838 (1916).
I Power Grocery Co. v. Hinton, 187 Ky. 171, 180, 218 S.W. 1013, 1018
(1920); George Bohon Co. v. Moren & Sipple, 151 Ky. 811, 815, 152 S.W. 944,
946 (1913).
m Carter v. Tucker, 205 Ky. 438, 443, 266 S.W. 9, 10 (1924); Hurtig v.
Lebus, 201 Ky: 125,-127, 255 S.W. 1060, 1061 (1923).
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however, seems of little practical importance here. The important
consideration is that, as agents, they may bind the other partners
by any action which is within the scope of the partnership pur-
poses and business.59 In the language of the Uniform Partnership
Act, "Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose
of its business, and the act of every partner, including the execu-
tion in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of
which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner
so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the
particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority."60
This language, on the whole, preserves well-established com-
mon law principles as to the scope of the power of a partner in
his capacity as an agent.61 It is true ambiguity lurks in the phrase
"for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member" since "usual way" may
mean "usuar' as to the manner in which the affairs of the par-
ticular partnership are conducted or "usuar' as to the manner in
which similar partnerships in the same locality operate their
business. However, both sources of authority were recognized
at common law, and both are no doubt intended to be applied
under the Act. Even if the language of the Act be held to refer
only to the course of business of the particular partnership, evi-
dence as to the course of business of similar partnerships would
seem available through Section 4(3)64 which states broadly that
"The law of agency shall apply under this act," or Section 5(1)65
that "In any case not provided for in this act the rules of law and
equity, including the law merchant, shall govern." Provisions
r' Russell v. Halteman's Adm'x, 287 Ky. 404, 158 S.W. 2d 899 (1941).
0The Act, Section 9(1); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.190(1) (Supp. 1954).
0L Kentucky, at common law, took the position that one partner could not bind
another by a sealed instrument without authority under seal. Trimble v. Coons,
9 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 375, 12 Am. Dec. 411 (1820); Cummins v. Cassely, 44
Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 74 (1844). But see McCart v. Lewis, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 267
(1842). The Act, by its provision as to execution of instruments in Section 9(1),
puts the emphasis on the execution being found to be within the scope of the
partnership business, thus abrogating the old common law rule. See Commis-
sioners' Note to Section 9, 7 U.L.A. 64 (1949).
CRANE, PATRNEiSmr sec. 49 (2d ed. 1952).
Ibid; Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply, 29 HARv. L. REv. 291,
299-300 (1916).
"Ky. REv. STAT. 362.165(3) (Supp. 1954).
'KY. REV. STAT. 362.170 (Supp. 1954).
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such as these would appear to make it clear that recognized
common law doctrines are not abrogated by the Act except
where the language and context of particular sections so require.
Conversely, "An act of a partner which is not apparently for
the carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual
way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other
partners." 0
These broad principles, as thus stated in the Act, leave un-
touched the vast body of case law which has attempted to mark
out those acts that may or may not be considered as coming
within the scope of the partnership business. This body of case
law must still be considered an integral and essential part of the
law of partnership even in those states which have adopted the
Act.
Generality has been departed from, however, to a limited
extent by the Act. In Section 9(3), G7 five types of transactions
are listed which are not to be considered as coming within the
authority of a partner (or less than all the partners) unless au-
thorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned
the business. They are: (1) assign the partnership property in
trust for creditors"8 or on the assignee's promise to pay the debts
of the partnership, (2) dispose of the good will of the business,
(8) do any other act which would make it impossible to carry
on the ordinary business of a partnership, (4) confess a judgment,
or (5) submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or
reference. 9
In working out the extent of the powers of partners to act for
the partnership, the common law observed a distinction between
commercial and non-commercial partnerships, and a number of
Kentucky decisions reflect this distinctionJ It is said that with
a commercial, or trading, partnership, certain powers, such as the
power to borrow money and execute negotiable paper, are im-
plied as a matter of law from the very existence of the partner-
ship and the nature of its business, whereas with a non-com-
'The Act, Section 9(2); Ky. REV. STAT. 362.190(2) (Supp. 1954).
°'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.190(3) (Supp. 1954).
' See Bull v. Harris, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 195 (1857).
'Compare Southard v. Steele, 19 Ky. (3 T. B. Mon.) 435 (1826).
'The leading Kentucky case appears to be Judge v. Braswell, 76 Ky. (13
Bush) 67, 26 Am. Rep. 185 (1877). See also Alsop v. Central Trust Co., 100 Ky.
375, 38 S.W. 510 (1897).
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mercial, or non-trading, partnership, no such implication arises
and the authority of the partners must be established affirmatively
by the person seeking to hold the firm liable.71 The Uniform Part-
nership Act leaves this distinction untouched, and in view of the
fact that it has become, and remains, such an integral part of
existing partnership law, it will no doubt continue to be used by
courts in the solution of cases arising under the Act. Basically,
the distinction seems to be recognition of the simple fact that
some partners, just as some agents, have more authority than
others, and that the scope of that authority may depend on the
nature of the business in which the firm is engaged. If the busi-
ness is one of a trading nature, there is the likelihood of more
extensive authority than if the business is of a more restricted or
special nature such as found in the case of many partnerships of
the non-commercial or non-trading variety., Nonetheless it is still
true that, "One partner may bind the firm in all business relating
to the partnership and in the regular and necessary course of the
business whether the copartnership be commercial or non-com-
mercial."72
2. Partnership Tort Liability.
The power of a partner to subject the partnership to a tort
liability while acting within the scope of the business is speci-
fically recognized in Section 18 of the Act.7 It is there stated
that the partnership is to be considered liable "to the same extent"
as the partner committing the wrongful act. This language has
proven significant in the solution of cases where the acting
In Linn v. Valz, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 846 (1890), the court held that one mem-
ber of a non-trading partnership could not bind his copartner by the execution of
a note unless he had authority to do so and that this authority must be established
as a fact by the person seeking to hold the firm liable. Furthermore, the court
said, the fact that the indebtedness for which the note was executed was such as
the partner had the right to incur in the conduct of the business did not of itself
confer the authority since by the execution of the note the form and character
of the indebtedness is changed and a new and different obligation is attempted to
be imposed on the firm. Accord, Cooper v. Nelson & Dabney, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 890
(1891).
vDavis, Moody & Co. v. Wiley, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 315, 320 (1881). Even in a
non-trading partnership it may appear that the power exists on the part of a single
partner to execute commercial paper in view of the original agreement between
the partners and the course of business pursued by them. O'Conner v. Sherely,
107 Ky. 70, 52 S.W. 1056 (1899).
'KY. REv. STAT. 362.210 (Supp. 1954). Breaches of trust by a partner
through the misapplication of money or property of a third person received by
the partner or the partnership are covered in Section 14 of the Act. Ky. REv.
STAT. 362.215 (Supp. 1954).
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partner enjoys a personal immunity from suit because of family
relationship to the person injured. In a leading New York case,74
it was used in support of a decision refusing to impose liability
on a partnership or the other partners individually for injuries
suffered by the wife of one of the partners as a result of the care-
less operation of an automobile on his part in the course of part-
nership business. In the law of agency, the modem trend, fol-
lowing the lead of Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co.,75 has been
to deny the principal the benefit of the agent's immunity.7 Since
partnership tort liability is considered as being joint and several
and since a partner is considered as being an agent for his co-
partners, it is arguable that under the ordinary principles of
agency, made a part of the Act in Section 4(8), 77 the copartners
may be held to individual liability for the tort committed regard-
less of the personal immunity of the acting partner. Nevertheless,
the language of Section 18 as literally applied pulls in the op-
posite direction, and though it may not have been formulated
with such a special case in mind,7" it will no doubt continue to
influence results in cases of this character. In some states, includ-
ing Kentucky, this problem would seem to be less acute, since
personal immunity in domestic relation situations, particularly
the marital relationship, has been removed in varying degrees by
statute or decision.7 9
3. Nature of Partnership Liability.
Section 15 of the Act80 preserves the common law conception
that a partner's liability in tort is joint and several while his
liability on contract debts and obligations is joint. This is recog-
nized as a rule of substantive law which is not intended to affect
procedural modifications introduced in a number of states where-
by joint liability is made in effect joint and several.8' It would
not, for example, interfere with the statutory provision in Ken-
tucky which provides that if two or more persons are jointly
' Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935).
'249 N. Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
" MEcHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY sec. 423 (4th ed. 1952).
' See note 64 supra.
"See Note, 36 COL. L. REv. 501 (1936). See also Note, 21 COmLL L. Q.
157 (1935).
" See Note, 42 Ky. L. J. 497 (1954).
' Ky. REv. STAT. 362.220 (Supn. 1954).
' See Commissioners' Note to Section 15, 7 U.L.A. 86 (1949).
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bound by contract, the action on such contract may be brought
against all or any of them at the plaintiff's option8 2
4. Rights of Partners in Management.
The Act provides that, in the absence of agreement to the con-
trary, "All partners have equal rights in the management and con-
duct of the partnership business,"8 " and that, "Any difference aris-
ing as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business
may be decided by a majority of the partners."84 Where the divi-
sion is equal, such as in a two-man partnership, the situation is
complicated by the practical inability to settle any differences
through majority rule. In such instances, it has been held at com-
mon law that a partner who dissents and notifies third parties
should not incur liability on a transaction entered into by his co-
partner with such third persons.85 Although the Act does not deal
specifically with such a situation, there is nothing contained
therein which suggests that this common law solution should not
be continued.8 6
The Act recognizes,8 7 as have numerous Kentucky decisions,88
that, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, a partner is not
entitled to compensation for his personal services in conducting
the partnership business.89 Furthermore, the Act recognizes, 90
'Ky. REv. STAT. 411.180 (1953). A good discussion of the nature of joint
liability at common law and as affected by the statutory modifications in Kentucky
will be found in Williams v. Rogers, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 776, 782-786 (1879), a
partnership case.
'The Act, Section 18(e); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.235(5) (Supp. 1954).
'The Act, Section 18(h); Ky. RFv. STAT. 362.285(8) (Supp. 1954).
' Dawson, Blackmore & Co. v. Elrod, 105 Ky. 624, 49 S.W. 465 (1899). But
existing contracts may be completed. Burns v. Treadway & Webb, 174 Ky. 123,
191 S.W. 868 (1917) (where one partner told debtor of firm not to settle with a
copartner this did not deprive the latter of authority to make settlement with the
debtor or in any way affect validity of the settlement).
'Some support might be found from the provision in Section 9(4) that "No
act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind the part-
nership to persons having knowledge of the restriction." Ky. R-v. STAT. 862.190(4)
(Supp. 1954). Dean Lewis, the draftsman, has said of Section 18(h), in reply
to a criticism that it should have contained something specific on the tvo-man
situation, "A contract made by one of two partners against the protest of the other
is not made by a majority. The implication from the section as worded, therefore,
is that such a contract, the third person knowing of the protest, would not be a
partnership contract." Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply, 29 HAv.
L. REv. 291, 302 (1916).
'The Act, Section 18(f); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.235(6) (Supp. 1954).
' Gordon v. Gordon, 291 Ky. 244, 163 S.W. 2d 454 (1942); Johnson v. Tri-
Union Oil & Gas Co., 278 Ky. 633, 129 S.W. 2d 111 (1939); Bemiss v. Widows'
& Orphans' Home of the Christian Church of Kentucky, 191 Ky. 316, 230 S.W.
310 (1921); Robertson v. Mechanics Trust & Savings Bank, 184 Ky. 287, 211
S.W. 858 (1919).
"This rule is held to apply even though there exists an inequality in the serv-
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as has the Kentucky court, that profits are to be shared equally
unless the parties have agreed to share them in some other pro-
portion.91
5. Fiduciary Relationship Between Partners.
The Kentucky court has found occasion frequently to stress
the fiduciary nature of the relationship between partners in the
conduct of the business affairs. 92 Indeed, the court has said that
"there is no relation of trust or confidence known to the law that
requires of the parties a higher degree of good faith than that
of a partnership."0 3 The court has also stressed that this obliga-
tion of good faith is not confined to persons who are actually
engaged in conducting a partnership, but extends also to persons
negotiating for a partnership and to persons engaged in the set-
tlement of partnership affairs after dissolution. 4 Section 21 of
the Act" recognizes the broad scope of this fiduciary relationship.
It provides that, "Every partner must account to the partnership
for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by
ices rendered and one partner may have performed the major portion, or even all,
the work involved in the conduct of the business. See cases cited note 88 supra.
Cf. Mattingly v. Stone, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 187, 35 S.W. 921 (1896) (where both
parties agree to contribute services and only one does so, an agreement will be
implied to compensate the active partner). Under Section 18(f) of the Act,
supra note 87, surviving partners are given the right to reasonable compensation
for their services performed in the winding up process. At common law such
compensation was generally refused except in extraordinary circumstances or
where the partnership agreement provided for it. See, e.g., Terrell v. Rowland,
86 Ky. 67, 4 S.W. 825 (1887). Compare Collins v. Hudson's Adm'x, 282 Ky.
810, 140 S.W. 2d 365 (1939).
'The Act, Section 18(a); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.235(1) (Supp. 1954).
'In Johnson v. Jackson, 130 Ky. 751, 755, 114 S.W. 260, 262 (1908), the
court said: "The law of partnership is well settled that, where the question is one
of division of profits, the presumption is that the profits are to be divided equally.
... Furthermore such equality will be presumed notwithstanding the fact that
the contributions to the firm capital are not equal, and whether the partners are
or are not on a par in regard to skill, connection, or character, or whether they
have or have not labored equally for the benefit of the partnership." But see
Pirtle v. Penn. 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 247, 250, 28 Am. Dec. 70, 72 (1835); Warring
v. Arthur, 98 Ky. 34, 40, 32 S.W. 221, 222 (1895).
" Some of the more recent cases include: Betts v. Smither, 310 Ky. 402, 220
S.W. 2d 989 (1949); Smith v. Gibson, 310 Ky. 114, 220 S.W. 2d 104 (1949);
Stephens v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 638, 183 S.W. 2d 822 (1944). Earlier decisions in-
clude: George v. Sohn's Adi'r, 191 Ky. 428, 230 S.W. 904 (1921); Axton v.
Kentucky Bottlers Supply Company, 159 Ky. 51, 166 S.W. 776 (1914).
' Hollowell v. Satterfield, 185 Ky. 397, 400, 215 S.W. 63, 65 (1919).
' See cases cited notes 92 and 93 supra. The fiduciary principle was applied
to a liquidating partner in Breyfogle v Bowman, 157 Ky. 62, 162 S.W. 787 (1914).
It was extended to negotiations r the sale of a partner's interest to a copartner
in Rankin v. Kelley, 163 Ky. 463, 173 S.W. 1151 (1915). But it was held in-
applicable in Miles v. Ashby, 295 Ky. 500, 174 S.W. 2d 753 (1943) where the
transaction was unconnected with the partnership business.
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.250 (Supp. 1954).
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him without the consent of the other partners from any trans-
action connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of
the partnership or from any use by him of its property."96 This
provision serves to emphasize the trust nature of the obligation
imposed on the offending partner. The claim against him under
the Act is not just that of an ordinary creditor but in the form of
a trust as to such property or money that can be traced.
It has long been recognized that, as a general rule, a suit at
law cannot be maintained by one partner against another on a
claim growing out of a partnership transactionT Furthermore,
it is also the well settled common law rule that, in general, one
partner cannot maintain an action against another in equity for
an accounting so long as the partnership continues but must
await a dissolution of the partnership at which time there can
be a full settlement of the accounts. 98 Courts have frowned on
encouraging partners to appeal to the judiciary to settle their
differences, since in addition to encouraging wasteful and need-
less litigation, it tends to destroy the mutual trust and confidence
which are at the very foundation of the partnership relation.9
Section 22 of the Act'00 gives a partner the right to an account
as to partnership affairs (a) where he has been wrongfully ex-
cluded from the partnership business or possession of its property
Kentucky cases in which a partner has been held accountable for profits in-
clude Marshall v. Bennett, 214 Ky. 328, 283 S.W. 115 (1926) (partner who trans-
ferred partnership land to a relative without profit as cloak for sale to another at
a profit held accountable to his copartners for their share of the profits); Chambers
v. Johnston, 180 Ky. 73, 201 S.W. 488 (1918) (partner held accountable for pro-
fits received from transaction entered into on his individual account but falling
within scope of the partnership business); White v. Jouett, 147 Ky. 197, 144 S.W.
55 (1912) (partner held to account for profits received through appropriating to
himself a business opportunity which belonged to the partnership); Deavenport
v. Green River Dep. Bank, 138 Ky. 352, 128 S.W. 88 (1910) (partner who pur-
chased a one-half interest in partnership note not allowed to profit by enforcing
this one-half interest against firm at its face value); Anderson v. Whitlock, 65 Ky.(2 Bush) 398, 92 Am. Dec. 489 (1867) (administrator of deceased partner not
allowed to keep profits received by partner as result of investment of partnership
funds).
I-ibbard v. Browning, 237 Ky. 754, 36 S.W. 2d 371 (1931); Baker v.
Ramey, 222 Ky. 694, 2 S.W. 2d 369 (1928); Lawrence v. Clark, 39 Ky. (9 Dana)
257, 35 Am. Dec. 133 (1840). This general rule, however, does not prevent an
action by one partner to a partnership contract against the other for its breach
by reason of defendant's failure to perform those things required of him for the
purpose of creating the partnership. Tevis v. Carter, 111 Ky. 938, 65 S.W. 17
(1901).
' Young v. McKenney, 197 Ky. 768, 247 S.W. 964 (1923).
'See the elaborate discussion in Lord v. Hull, 178 N. Y. 9, 70 N.E. 69
(1904).
"'Ky. BEv. STAT. 362.255 (Supp. 1954).
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by his copartners,1°1 (b) where the right exists pursuant to the
terms of any agreement, (c) where he may charge his copartner
for benefits derived in violation of his fiduciary position, and (d)
"Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable." 10'
While this language may be somewhat more flexible than some
statements of the common law rule, the common law itself recog-
nized exceptions to the general rule, and courts will no doubt
continue under the Act to exercise the same degree of caution
and circumspection in granting an account prior to dissolution
as they did at common law.103
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
1. In General.
At common law, the determination as to what constitutes
partnership property is governed by the intention of the parties.0 4
It is therefore said to be within the power of the partners to
determine what property shall be made a part of the firm assets
and what property shall be and remain that of the individual
partner or partners. 0 5 Kentucky cases have accepted the rule of
presumption that, in the absence of a clearly indicated intention
to the contrary, real estate acquired with partnership funds and
used for partnership purposes is presumed to be partnership
property, 0 and its correlary that if such property was not paid
for with partnership funds but with the individual funds of the
partners, the presumption is that the parties did not intend to
hold it as partnership property even though it may have been
used in the firm business. 07 These rules and presumptions are
'Accord, Pirtle v. Penn, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 247, 28 Am. Dec. 70 (1835).
'In Pirtle v. Penn, supra note 101, the court said at 248, 28 Am. Dec. at 71:
"But both principle and authority tend to the conclusion that a bill for an account
between copartners, may be maintained without a prayer for a dissolution of the
partnership, if there is any good reason for compelling an account and settlement."
' In their note to Section 22, the Commissioners said: "In view of the word-
ing of clause (d), the total effect of this section is to emphasize the fact, that a
partner, the partnership not being dissolved, has not, necessarily the right to de-
mand formal accounts, except at particular times and under particular circum-
stances." 7 U.L.A. 125, 126 (1949).
"'CnANE, PATNERsHm sec. 37 (2d ed. 1952); TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
sec. 446 (3d ed. 1939).
" CRANE, PA ETNmEsm sec. 37 (2d ed. 1952).
' Spalding v. Wilson & Muir, 80 Ky. 589 (1883).
' Wilhite's Admr v. Boulware, 88 Ky. 169, 10 S.W. 629 (1899). This pre-
sumption was extended to a real estate lease owned by a partner at the time of
formation of the partnership in Sanderfur v. Ganter, 259 S.W. 2d 15 (Ky. 1953).
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left undisturbed by the Uniform Partnership Act. Section 8(1)108
provides that "All property originally brought into the partner-
ship stock or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise,
on account of the partnership, is partnership property", and Sec-
tion 8(2)109 states that, "Unless the contrary intention appears,
property acquired with partnership funds is partnership prop-
erty."110
2. Legal Title to Partnership Real Estate.
Other provisions of the Act pertaining to partnership property
involve rather important changes in common law concepts. Sec-
tion 8(3)," for example, provides that title to real estate may be
taken in the partnership name. Such a mode of conveyance was
not possible at common law due to the requirement that legal
title to real property must always vest in a legal person and the
refusal of the common law courts to recognize the partnership as
other than an aggregate of the individuals composing it. The
common law did ameliorate its position somewhat by recognizing
that if the partnership name included the surname of one or more
of the partners, the legal title would be deemed to vest in such
partner or partners, to be held in trust for the partnership.1 2
This has even been carried by some courts to the point of per-
mitting parol evidence to be introduced, where a firm name is
used, to establish the membership of the partnership with a
vesting of the legal title in the members as tenants in common." 3
The need for resort to these techniques in order to save con-
veyances is now rendered unnecessary by the provision in the
Act permitting the vesting of title in the partnership name.
It should be carefully observed, however, that the Act does
not require that conveyances be made to the partnership in the
partnership name. Conveyance, if desired, may still be made to
one or more of the partners or to the partners jointly. However,
there is a certain disadvantage involved, present under the Act
"Ky. RBv. STAT. 862.185(1) (Supp. 1954).
'KY. REv. STAT. 362.185(2) (Supp. 1954).Note that under the Act it is not necessary that the property actually be
appropriated to partnership uses for the presumption to apply. Accord, Flanagan
v. Shuck, 82 Ky. 617 (1884). But of. Bank of Louisville v. Hall & Long, 71 Ky.
(8 Bush) 672 (1872).
"Ky. REv. STAT. 862.185(3) (Supp. 1954).
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY sec. 444 (3d ed. 1939).
Ibid.
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as well as at common law, in placing record title in the names of
one or more, but less than all, of the partners. While it is true in
such instances that the partners to whom conveyance is made
will be deemed to hold the legal title in trust for the partnership,
there is the ever present danger that the record title will not
reveal the interest of the partnership, with the result that a bona
fide purchaser for value from the individual partner or partners
will cut off the equitable claim of the partnership.: 4
Section 10 of the Act" 5 contains a series of provisions dealing
with the power of a partner or partners to convey title to partner-
ship real estate both in those cases where the title is in the
partnership name and also in those cases where title is in the
name of one or more of the partners. In the situation just con-
sidered where title is in the name of one or more but not all of
the partners, and the record does not disclose the right of the
partnership, the partnership is precluded from recovering the
property from a bona fide purchaser even though the partner or
partners in whose name the title stands exceeded his or their
authority in making the conveyance." 6 On the other hand, where
the title is in the names of all the partners, a conveyance executed
by all the partners passes all their rights in such property." 7 If
the title stands in the name of the firm, any partner may bind the
partnership to a conveyance of the property in the partnership
name provided he has acted within the scope of his authority."-
If he has exceeded his authority, the partnership may recover the
property unless it has in the meantime been conveyed by the
grantee to a holder for value who is without knowledge that the
partner exceeded his authority in making the conveyance." 9
8. Equitable Conversion of Real Estate.
The common law requirement that legal title to real estate be
"& See Seeley v. Mitchell's Assignee, 85 Ky. 508, 4 S.W. 190 (1887) (mort-
gage). And see Cain's Adm'r v. Hubble, 184 Ky. 38, 211 S.W. 413 (1919);
Mildren v. Root, 262 Ky. 826, 91 S.W. 2d 523 (1936).
" Ky. REv. STAT. 362.195 (Supp. 1954).
"" Subsection (3).
"'Subsection (5).
"'Subsection (1).
"'*Ibid. Under subsection (2) where title is in the name of the partnership
and conveyance is made in his own name by a partner within the scope of his
authority, the conveyance passes the equitable interest of the partnership. A
similar result follows under subsection (4) in the converse situation where title is
in the name of one or more of the partners and conveyance is made in the partner-
ship name.
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taken in the name of one or more of the partners led to compli-
cations when a partner died in whose name title rested. Consider,
for example, the case where the partners held title jointly as
co-tenants. Legal title to the deceased partner's share would
descend to his heirs at law, subject to the dower rights of his
widow. There remained the equitable right on the part of the
surviving partners to have the partnership property used first for
satisfaction of partnership obligations and in the settlement of
partnership affairs. This right was recognized by courts of equity
through the fiction of treating the real estate as "converted"
into personalty.12  Difference of opinion existed, however, over
whether, after liquidation, the deceased partner's share should
go to his personal representative as personalty or whether at
that point a "reconversion" should take place and any remain-
ing real estate should descend as real estate to the heirs with
dower rights in the widow. The English courts adopted the
"out-and-out" conversion theory, and this has been preserved in
the English Partnership Act.12' In this country, however, the
majority of the courts have adopted the "pro tanto" theory, that
is, that the real estate is to be deemed personalty only for pur-
poses of settling the partnership affairs. To that extent the part-
nership realty is impressed with a trust and is held by the partners
as tenants in common subject to that trust. After the firm pur-
poses have been satisfied, however, any remaining realty is held
by the partners as tenants in common free from any trust and
subject to the usual incidents of such a tenancy, including descent
to the heirs of the deceased partner.22 Early Kentucky cases
wavered as to which theory to adopt,'2 3 until in Carter v.
Flexner124 it was settled in favor of the pro tanto theory.125
CRANE:, PATNErsmar sec. 45 (2d ed. 1952).
Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew. 495, 61 Eng. Rep. 992 (1856); PRvTNEnsHrp
AcT, 1890, 58 & 54 Vict. 89, sec. 22.
See 2 AamrcAN LAw OF PnoPERTY sec. 6.8 (1952). It is well established
under the protanto theory that once partnership purposes have been satisfied and
the land again takes on its character as real estate, dower interests of the widow
attach. See Bennett v. Bennett, 187 Ky. 17, 20, 121 S.W. 495, 496 (1910).
'Compare Galbraith v. Gedge, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 631 (1855) (pro
tanto) with Cornwall v. Cornwall, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 869 (1869) (out-and-out);
and see the attempt at reconciliation of the two cases on the basis of intent of the
parties in Lowe v. Lowe, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 688 (1878) (pro tanto). The early
Kentucky cases are collected in Note, 25 A.L.R. 889, 897-400 (1923).
92 Ky. 400, 17 S.W. 851 (1891).
The court reaffirmed this position in Strode v. Kramer, 298 Ky. 354, 169
S.W. 2d 29 (1948). In Carter v. Flexner, supra note 124, the court rejected the
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While the situation under the Uniform Partnership Act is not
as clear as it might be, the sum total of the pertinent provisions
point rather strongly in the direction of the English rule of out-
and-out conversion. The Act provides that on the death of a
partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the
surviving partner or partners and that a partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allow-
ances to widows, heirs, or next of kin. 2 ' It is stated that on dis-
solution each partner may have the partnership property applied
to discharge its liabilities and the surplus applied to pay in cash
the net amount owing to him. 27 There is the further provision
that a partner's interest in the partnership, that is, his share of
the profits and surplus, is to be considered personal property. 28
Well-considered cases under the Act have found in these pro-
visions an intent to adopt the rule that the property is converted
into personalty for all purposes.2 9
If this interpretation of the Act be accepted, the change
thereby effected in Kentucky law will be of importance in at
least two directions. In the first place, it will affect the rights of
those concerned in the ultimate distribution of the deceased
partner's share in the partnership. It may make considerable dif-
ference to the widow, for example, whether she receives a dower
interest in the property as real estate or whether she may receive
proposition that the solution should depend on the intent of the parties since it
was felt this left too much room for speculation over the question of intent. How-
ever, under the pro tanto rule it has been generally agreed that the parties may
effect a more complete conversion by agreement between them. The case is all
the more striking in this respect since it involved a partnership to deal in land,
and it has been said that in partnerships of that character it will be assumed that
the parties intended an out-and-out conversion. See MECHEM, PARTNERSmP see.
163 n. 36 (2 ed. 1920).
'The Act Section 25(2) (d) and (2) (e); Ky. REv. STAT. 862.270(2) (d)
and (2) (e) (Supp. 1954). These provisions, standing alone, are inconclusive
since they are open to the interpretation that they merely recognize the existence
of a conversion to the extent necessary to protect partnership creditors and the
rights of the partners inter se but have nothing to do with the course of descent
and distribution. See 3 AmaucAN LAW OF PROPERTY sec. 14.16 (1952).
'The Act, Section 38(1); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.835(1) (Supp. 1954).
L'4The Act. Section 26; Ky. REv. STAT. 362.275 (Supp. 1954).
'-Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922); Cultra v. Cultra, 188
Tenn. 506, 221 S.W. 2d 533 (1949). Contra: Hannold v. Hannold, 4 N. J. Super.
Ct. 381, 67 A. 2d 352 (1949). Support for invoking the out-and-out conversion.
rule under the Act may be found in the comments of the draftsman. See Lewis,
The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J. 617, 637 (1915). Leading text-
writers in the field of real property also lend their support to this interpretation
of the Act. See POwELL, REAL PROPERTY sec. 139 (1949); 2 TiFFANY, REAL
PRtoPERTY see. 444 (3d ed. 1949).
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an outright share in the proceeds of the property as personalty.' 30
In the second place, it may well affect the mode of conveyance
of the legal title by the surviving partners in the settlement and
liquidation of partnership affairs.' 3 ' This, in fact, was the primary
issue which confronted the Kentucky court in Carter v. Flexner,
and it was concluded that, since the title of the deceased partner
descended to his heirs, subject to the right of the surviving partner
to sell the real estate in settlement of partnership claims, convey-
ance by the heirs, and widow, would be necessary to pass a com-
plete legal title to the purchaser and the latter was not required to
take merely the conveyance of the surviving partner.132 Under the
out-and-out conversion theory adopted by the Act it is arguable
that title to the real estate never descends to the heirs at all, but, as
personalty, passes to the surviving partners with full power on their
part to convey a complete legal title. It has been so held by the
Supreme Court of Illinois in Wharf v. Wharf, 33 a leading case
involving the construction and application of the Act to this
problem.' The change thus effected would foreclose the con-
veyancing complication which confronted the Kentucky court
recently under the pro tanto theory in the case of Baker v. Wides'
Ex'r,"'3 where the son of a deceased partner was held as a prisoner
of war by the Japanese during World War II. The court held
that any sale of the real estate must be through the medium of a
'See Ky. REv. STAT. 892.020 (1958); Lowe v. Lowe, 76 Ky. (13 Bush)
688 (1878). And see Cultra v. Cultra, supra note 129 (contest between deceased
partner's widow and after-born child).
' A third possible effect is in the area of state inheritance taxes. See CRANE,
PARTNERSa see. 45 (2d ed. 1952).
'The case of Strode v. Kramer, 293 Ky. 854, 169 S.W. 2d 29 (1948) like-
wise involved a conveyancing issue, with the court holding that a bank, as the
personal representative of a deceased partner, who was the surviving partner in
a former partnership with his brother, could not convey partnership real estate,
in the absence of powers conferred by his will, so as to bind adult children to
whom the property had passed as'legatees under his will. Compare the provision
in Section 25(2) (d) of the Act to the effect that where the deceased is the last
surviving partner, his right to specific partnership property vests in his legal repre-
sentatives. Ky. REv. STAT. 862.270(2) (d) (Supp. 1954).
306 I1. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922).
" This view is also expressed in BuRoicx, PAR iasmp 109 (3d ed. 1917).
Where, however, the legal title, instead of being held jointly by all the partners, is
held in the name of the deceased partner, it is not so clear that the surviving
partners can convey the legal title, although it is clear that they could transfer the
equitable interest and seek court aid, if necessary, to compel the heirs of the de-
ceased partner to make the necessary conveyance of the legal title. See 3 ANMnI-
CAN LAw OF PROPERTY sec. 14.16 (1952).
299 Ky. 414, 185 S.W. 2d 699 (1945).
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judicial sale, since the son obviously was not in a position to
execute a deed.
4. Nature and Legal Incidents of Ownership-Creditors' Rights.
It has been customary in the decisions at common law, Ken-
tucky included, to speak of partners as tenants in common of
partnership property, particularly real estate.'3 6 This label, how-
ever, is not strictly accurate since, as Professor Mechem has aptly
observed, a partner cannot deal with his interest as co-tenant
with the same freedom as is ordinarily available to tenants in
common. 37 For one thing, his interest as tenant in common does
not enable him to transfer that interest to another so as to put
such person in his place with power as co-owner of partnership
property to use it for partnership purposes.'38  This would in
effect be forcing a new partner on the other partners which would
violate the fundamental precept that partnership is a voluntary
relationship.'39 Furthermore, it is said that each partner has a
right, referred to as the partner's lien, to have the property of the
partnership applied in payment of the debts and liabilities of the
firm.' 40 This right is inconsistent with the ordinary incidents of
tenancy in common.
Professor Mechem has also pointed out that partners should
not be considered as mere joint tenants of partnership property,
since in ordinary joint tenancy, a right of survivorship exists
which gives the survivor a complete beneficial ownership.' 4' In
'Galbraith v. Gedge, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 631, 634 (1855); 2 T=ANY,
REAL PROPERTY sec. 445 (3d ed. 1939). In Wilhite's Adm'r v. Boulware, 88 Ky.
169, 171, 10 S.W. 629, 630 (1899), the court said: "The principle is universally
recognized that at law real estate owned by a partnership, even if purchased in the
name of the partnership, and with partnership funds, is held by the members of
the firm as tenants in common, and is subject to all the incidents of land held in
common."
"r MECHEM, PARTNERsas se. 143 (2d ed. 1920).
Ibid.
See Commissioners' Note to Section 25, 7 U.L.A. 144, 145 (1949); CRANE,
PARTwEnsm sec. 40 (2d ed. 1952).
"'Hagan v. Hurst, 228 Ky. 645, 15 S.W. 2d 446 (1929); MECHEM, PART-
NEnsmap sec. 143 (2d ed. 1920). The partner's lien extends not only to partnership
obligations owing to outside third parties but also to obligations of the firm owed
to individual partners. Walter v. Herman, 110 Ky. 800, 62 S.W. 857 (1901);
Holmes v. Stix, Krouse & Co., 104 Ky. 351, 47 S.W. 243 (1898). In McGlone v.
Smith, 293 Ky. 131, 168 S.W. 2d 566 (1943), a partner sought a priority in part-
nership assets over all other liens on the theory of subrogation as a result of his
payment of a partnership note which he and his partner had executed early in
the venture and which was secured by a mortgage. This was denied on the ground
that he was not entitled to any distributable share in the partnership property until
all firm creditors had been satisfied.
... MECHEM, PARTNERSHIn sec. 143 (2d ed. 1920).
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the case of partners, however, the survivorship is of a more
limited character, the survivor being entitled to the property
only for those purposes related to a winding up of partnership
affairs.142
Calling the ownership that of tenancy in common or joint
tenancy would perhaps be of no particular consequence if it were
a mere matter of attaching a descriptive label. It is not quite that
simple, however, since the nature of the partner's interest in
partnership property has a marked effect in the solution of at
least two other vexing matters concerning partnership property,
namely, the extent to which a partner can transfer or assign his
interest in partnership property and the extent to which separate
creditors of a partner can reach his interest in such property.
The common law recognized that a partner could dispose of
his share in partnership property but that, under the influence
of the partner's lien, the transferee took subject to the right of the
other partners to have the property applied first to the satisfaction
of partnership obligations. In Fyffe v. Slcaggs,143 for example, the
Kentucky court held that, where two partners were the joint
owners of an oil rig and equipment, a sale of his half interest by
one of the partners was subject to settlement of partnership debts
incurred in the operation of the equipment and for which the
property would be liable in the hands of the purchaser. The
court said:
It is an elementary rule that each partner has a
lien upon all of the firm's property for the payment of the
partnership debts and that they have the right to have the
property of the partnership applied to the payment of the
firm's debts. Such lien arises when the partnership is
entered into and continues throughout its existence.... A
partner has no interest in the partnership assets which may
be subjected to his individual debts, nor can it be mortgaged
or sold by him free of the firm's debts, until the partnership
debts are satisfied. (Emphasis supplied) 44
'See 2 AmRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY sec. 6.8 (1952).
'=246 Ky. 5, 54 S.W. 2d 369 (1932).
,"Id. at 8-9, 54 S.W. 2d at 371. An assignment by way of mortgage of spe-
cific partnership property likewise comes under the protective cloak of the part-
ner's lien. In Hagan v. Hurst, 228 Ky. 645, 15 S.W. 2d 446 (1929), where a
partner mortgaged his interest in the partnership assets to individual creditors, it
was held in a contest between the mortgagees and partnership creditors on dis-
solution that the partnership creditors should prevail and that it was immaterial
whether their claims arose prior to or subsequent to the mortgage since the lien
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The partner's lien has also played a large part in the solution
of cases involving the rights of individual creditors of a partner.
It has been generally recognized that a partner's interest is sub-
ject to attachment and execution, but that the individual creditor,
or purchaser at an execution sale, should not be allowed to inter-
fere with the right of the other partners to have the partnership
property made available for the satisfaction of firm debts.145 A
separate creditor thus can subject to the payment of his debt only
whatever his debtor is entitled to in the partnership assets on a
full settlement of the partnership affairs.. 46
It should be evident, then, that the interest of a partner
Which is transferable by him or which can be reached by his
individual creditors at common law is not his interest in specific
items of property but rather his interest in the partnership con-
sisting in whatever may remain as his share after firm obligations
are settled.147
Attempt was made in the drafting of the Uniform Partnership
Act to construct a series of provisions which it was thought would
best recognize and promote these peculiar incidents that sur-
round the ownership of partnership property. 4s Section 24149
divides the property rights of a partner into three distinct di-
visions: (1) his rights in specific partnership property, (2) his
interest in the partnership, and (3) his right to participate in the
management. Section 25,150 in elaboration of the nature of a
partner's right in specific partnership property, provides that, "A
partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership
property holding as a tenant in partnership." The Act thus recog-
nizes that co-ownership of partnership property is sui generis, and
arises at the time the partnership is formed and continues throughout the existence
of the partnership. Accord, Gowin v. Lake, 243 Ky. 442, 48 S.W. 2d 1059 (1932).
sCun, PArT usBI, sec. 43 (2d ed. 1952).
In Per Ban g Trus C mpan v.Npe, 4 y 469 , 42 S.W. 2d69(13)
twhel errtpemtteidvdainetdssoapartne tob8pifrom a partnership bank account where there had been no partnership accounting.
The court said at 472, 42 S.W. 2d at 695: "From the foregoing and numerousot r a t orities of simla import, we find the general rule t  be that a partner
has no individual title to firm assets, but that his interest in the partnership fundsis but a chose in action or a ight to his proportionate share of whatever remains
after the partnership indebtedness is paid and the equities as between the parties
adjusted by proper accounting.
"' See ME~cEM , PA ,n~ rn Ssm sec. 146 (2d ed. 1920).
a~ e Commissioners' Note to Section 25, 7 U.L.A. 144 (1949).
' iKy. boV. STAT. 362.265 (Supp. 1954).
az"Ky, R'. STAT. 362.270 (Supp. 1954).
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avoids the difficulties involved in attaching to the relationship
the traditional common law labels of joint tenancy or tenancy in
common. Section 26151 describes the nature of a partner's interest
in the partnership as "his share of the profits and surplus".
The provisions of Section 25 which indicate the incidents to
be ascribed to tenancy in partnership are of particular interest.
It is there provided, among other things, that a partner's right in
specific partnership property "is not assignable except in con-
nection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in the
same property",152 and that a partner's right in specific partnership
property "is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a
claim against the partnership."1 3 It is recognized, however, in
Section 27-15 that a partner may assign or convey his interest in
the partnership, and by Section 28'55 a procedure is provided
through means of a "charging order" whereby judgment creditors
of a partner may reach the debtor partner's interest in the partner-
ship.
An assignee under his assignment receives only a right to such
profits as the assignor partner would be entitled to during the
continuance of the partnership'56 and in case of dissolution to
whatever would be coming to the assignor partner.157 The as-
signee has no right to interfere in the management or administra-
tion of the partnership business during its continuance,'58 and
' Ky. REV. STAT. 362.275 (Supp. 1954).
"'Subsection (2) (b); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.270(2) (b) (Supp. 1954).
"'Subsection (2) (c); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.270(2) (c) (Supp. 1954). This
provision further states that, "When partnership property is attached for a part-
nership debt the partners, or any of them, or the representatives of a deceased
partner, cannot claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.' The de-
cisions at common law were in conflict. CRANE, PARTNESm~ sec. 44 (2d ed.
1952). Kentucky seems to have been in accord with the position adopted by the
Act. Green, Huffaker & Co. v. Taylor & Son, 98 Ky. 330, 32 S.W. 945 (1895).
'Ky. REV. STAT. 362.280 (Supp. 1954).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.285 (Supp. 1954).
'The Act, Section 27(1); Ky. REV. STAT. 362.280(1) (Supp. 1954).
'The Act, Section 27(2); Ky. REV. STAT. 362.280(2) (Supp. 1954).
'See note 137 supra. It is also stated in this same section that a conveyance
by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the part-
nership. However, if the assigning partner neglects his duties to the partnership,
the other partners may ask a court to dissolve the partnership under Section 31
of the Act, Ky. REv. STAT. 362.305 (Supp. 1954). In Power Grocery Co. v. Hin-
ton, 187 Ky. 171, 218 S.W. 1013 (1920) the court held that, while an assignment
of an interest in a partnership as security for a debt does not work a dissolution
where the transaction contemplates a continuance of the partner's interest and au-
thority in the partnership, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors operated
as an automatic dissolution.
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may force a dissolution only where the term of the partnership
has expired 59 or where the partnership is one at will.'16
The charging order is an innovation taken directly from the
English Partnership Act, where it is said to have "given great
satisfaction."' It provides, in substance, that any judgment
creditor of a partner may apply to a court to have the interest of
the debtor partner charged with payment of the unsatisfied
amount of the judgment. The court may then or later appoint a
receiver of his share of the profits, and make any other orders
which the circumstances of the case may require. 62 One distinct
advantage which this procedure has over the common law pro-
cedure of attachment or execution is that it avoids interruptions
which may occur in the continued operation of the business by
the non-debtor partners where a sheriff must actually levy on
the partnership property. Indeed, it has been observed that
where the creditor can actually attach or levy execution, he
possesses an effective weapon whereby he can hold up the whole
firm for the debt of one of their members, since the non-debtor
partners may be compelled to take action to protect their interests
in the free use and enjoyment of the property. 63
It was in this area that some of the greatest confusion de-
veloped in the law of partnership at common law. Ordinarily, the
sheriff levied a separate creditor's execution by seizing a part or
all of the tangible property of the firm, taking actual possession
of the property, and selling the debtor partner's interest in the
property. 64 The purchaser, however, was not entitled to take
and hold possession of any specific chattel as against the firm.
'The Act, Section 32(2) (a); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.305(2) (a) (Supp. 1954).
"®TheAct, Section 32(2) (b); Ky. RiEv. STAT. 362.305(2) (b) (Supp. 1954).
' Commissioners' Note to Section 28, 7 U.L.A. 163 (1949).
"The Act, Section 28(1); Ky. REV. STAT. 362.285(1) (Supp. 1954). Sub-
section (2) contains provisions enabling a redemption of the interest charged, and
subsection (3) preserves to the debtor partner, with regard to his interest in the
partnership, any right which he may have under the exemption laws. The Ken-
tucky court recognized this exemption right in Southern Jellico Coal Co. v. Smith,
105 Ky. 769, 49 S.W. 807 (1899). o r.
'Wright, California Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act, 9
CALiF. L. REv. 206, 225 (1921).
"' BurDicr, PARTNERsmp 270-273 (3d ed. 1917). Some difference of opinion
existed as to whether the sheriff must seize all of the tangible property or could
seize a part only. In Aldrich v. Wallace, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 287 (1839), the court
held that where the property consisted of a number of articles (composing the
merchandise of a grocery store) the debtor's interest in the whole should not be
sold in gross, but the articles should be taken separately, and his individuql inter-
est in each sold separately unless the peculiar character of the articles would make
it improper to separate them.
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He merely acquired the right to demand an accounting and re-
ceive whatever might be found to be coming to the debtor
partner.165 In England, and in some American jurisdictions, equity
intervened on behalf of the debtor or his copartners and ap-
pointed a receiver to ascertain the debtor partner's interest, en-
joining the sheriff from selling the interest.'66 This prevented a
needless sacrifice of the debtor partner's interest through a sale
of it at a time when its value would be highly speculative. 167
Kentucky law includes legislation specifically directed at regu-
lation of the sale under execution of property held jointly by a
debtor with others. 68 It is broad enough to cover partnership
situations as well as others involving jointly held property. Under
this legislation, where an officer levies execution upon personal
property held jointly by the debtor with another person, he is not
permitted to deprive such person of possession of the property
except for the purpose of having it inventoried and appraised.
When he has performed these duties, he makes return of the
execution to the office from which it was issued, and his powers
are then exhausted. The execution creditor is given a lien which
he may enforce by action in equity. 6 ' It has been said of this
legislation by the Kentucky court that its fundamental purpose
was "to prevent sales of the interests of separate joint owners in
personal property under executions, to avoid the sacrifice of the
rights of the joint owner not in the execution and to substitute a
" BuamcK, PARTNESHmp 273 (3d ed. 1917).
' Id. at 274. In Watson v. Gabby, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 658, 663 (1857)
the court said, in a suit on a claimant's bond, that the right of an execution creditor
to subject to levy and sale under his execution the interest of such partner in the
effects belonging to the partnership concern was unquestionable, and that if the
other partner in such case claimed the whole of the partnership effects for the
benefit of the creditors of the firm, he must resort to a court of equity for settlement
of the partnership. The court, however, found it unnecessary to determine at what
stage of the proceeding under execution the aid of the chancellor should be in-
voked, whether before or after a sale had been completed by the sheriff, since the
only question before the court was whether the property levied on was subject to
execution. In Williams v. Smith, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 540 (1868), where execution
against a 1artner was levied on partnership property and a sale suspended under
a claimants bond, it was held any equitable cause could be shown against judg-
ment on the bond and that since the property involved was partnership property,
a settlement of the partnership should be had and only the interest of that partner
subjected to the bond.
"I BuRmcK, PArrnsm, 274 (3d ed. 1917).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 426.680 (1953).
1
" Jones v. Martin, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 227 (1883); Vicory v. Strausbaugh, 78 Ky.
425 (1880). If in such action it should develop that the debtor has no interest in
the property because the partnership liabilities exceed the assets of the firm, the
creditor will not be entitled to judgment. Holmes v. Miller, 41 S.W. 432 (Ky.
1897).
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new and distinct mode of proceeding in equity by which the
interests of all could be fully protected." 170
Much the same purpose lies behind the charging order pro-
cedure established by the Uniform Partnership Act. The applica-
tion by the creditor to the court for a charging order will now,
it appears, as to jointly held partnership property, supersede the
suit in equity sanctioned under existing legislation as to jointly
held property generally.'7 ' However, the authority given the
court under the charging order procedure is broad and would
seem to afford as much opportunity, and possibly more, to protect
the interests of all concerned as would be available to the chan-
cellor exercising his equity powers under the proceeding in
equity. 72
The foregoing discussion has been concerned with the rights
of separate creditors against partnership property. The converse
situation also presents itself, that is, the extent to which firm
creditors may avail themselves of the processes of attachment or
execution against the separate property of the individual partners.
It is clear under Section 25(2) (c) of the Act173 that partnership
property is subject to attachment or execution on a claim against
the partnership, and, in view of the personal liability which each
partner carries as to firm obligations, it follows that his separate
estate is also open to being subjected to a lien by attachment or
execution by partnership creditors. 74 Here, the general law as
to executions and attachments would appear to govern, un-
' Jones v. Martin, supra note 169 at 283. This legislation was applied to a
levy on jointly owned real estate in Payne v. Pollard, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 127 (1867).
'x' See the excellent discussion of the nature of a partner's right in specific
partnership property and the charging order in Windom Nat. Bank v. Klein, 191
Minn. 447, 254 N.W. 602 (1934). A court, in its discretion, can direct a sale of
the debtor-partner's interest, if that seems most advisable. Frankel v. Frankel, 15
Pa. D. & C. 103 (1931). But a court should no doubt exercise such discretion
with the utmost care lest it precipitate a situation whereby the purchaser could
disrupt the partnership business. This would be a particularly grave danger in a
partnership at will, since under the Act the purchaser of a partner's interest in
the course of a charging order proceeding is given the same right to seek dissolu-
tion as in the case of the purchaser where one partner has voluntarily sold his
interest. See notes 156 and 157 supra; Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership
Law and The Uniform Partnership Act, 9 Omo ST. L. J. 616, 689-640 (1948).
"'The charging order would also appear to supersede, in partnership cases,
the provisions of Ky. REv. STAT. 425.250 prohibiting a sheriff, in executing an
attachment on jointly held personal property, from taking possession until a bond
is executed by plaintiff.
"I Ky. REv. STAT. 362.270(2) (c) (Supp. 1954).
""BunuicK, PARTNERsmp 251 (3d ed. 1917); MEcnEm, PARTNERSHIP sec.
314 (2d ed. 1920).
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affected by the Uniform Partnership Act.15 The picture changes
somewhat, however, when the partnership and separate estates
come under the protective cloak of the equity court or bank-
ruptcy court in insolvency proceedings, as will be discussed later.
The general theory on which the property provisions of the
Act are framed suggest another possible change in common law
principles. As indicated, through subrogation to the partner's
lien, creditors of a partnership have the right that partnership
assets be appropriated to payment of their debts before individual
creditors of a partner can acquire any rights in the property.
Many courts, however, have emphasized that the right to the
lien in favor of partnership creditors is not an inherent right, but
only a derivative one through the members of the partnership,
and if the members have in any way waived or otherwise lost
their lien, the partnership creditors can possess no greater rights.
In Jones v. Lusk,- 76 for example, the Kentucky court refused to
sustain the propriety of an injunction issued by the chancellor on
a petition to enjoin partners from selling partnership property
and using the proceeds to pay their individual debts, where the
allegations were otherwise insufficient to give the chancellor
jurisdiction such as on grounds of fraud. Again, in Couchman's
Adm r v. Maupin,17 7 where the contest was between partnership
creditors claiming under a deed of trust of the partnership prop-
erty and an individual judgment creditor who had placed an
execution in the hands of the sheriff on a joint non-partnership
obligation several days prior to the execution of the deed of trust,
the court denied the priority of the partnership creditors.'
The results reached in the Jones and Couchman cases may
well be considered logical and inevitable results of the "partner's
lien" theory.179 Since the property provisions of the Act are not
I E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. 425.250 (1953) pertaining to attachment proceedings
against joint debtors would seem to be unaffected by the Act and to be applicable
to proceedings against partners.
17859 Ky. 356 (1859).
- 78 Ky. 33 (1879).
178 Although the sheriff did not actually make his levy until the day after the
deed of trust was executed, the execution bound the property from the time it
was placed in the hands of the sheriff. The property had thus been subjected to
the lien of the individual creditor before the partnership creditors acquired their
rights under the deed of trust.
I-*In Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Huntington National
Bank, 229 Ky. 674, 17 S.W. 2d 726 (1929), the court reaffirmed the derivative
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constructed on this theory but more nearly on the theory that
partnership property belongs to the partnership as an entity or
at least that the rights of the partners in specific property are
only such rights as center around the use of such property for
partnership purposes, the results reached in these two cases, and
others like them, would no longer seem required or even ap-
propriate. 80
DIssoL IoN AND TERM ILNATION
1. Dissolution Defined.
Dissolution is defined in the Uniform Partnership Act as "the
change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceas-
ing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the
winding up of the business."' s ' It is stated further that, "On dis-
solution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until
the winding up of partnership affairs is completed."8 2 As ex-
plained by the Commissioners, "In this act dissolution designates
the point in time when the partners cease to carry on the business
together; termination is the point in time when all the partner-
ship affairs are wound up; winding up, the process of settling
partnership affairs after dissolution." 8
nature of the lien of the partnership creditor and held that, in view of the partner's
lien, a creditor of an individual partner could not garnishee insurance companies
on money due the partnership, since partnership debts far exceeded the entire
amount of the insurance involved and the aggregate sum of all possible assets
belonging to the partnership. The court applied the general rule that the liability
of the garnishee is to be determined by whether the principal debtor has a right
of action against the garnishee, and since here nothing would be coming to theindividual partners, there was no basis for the garnishment action. See also
Planters'-Farmers' Warehouse Company of Loisville v. Citizens' Bank of Fal-
mouth, 224 Ky. 466, 6 S.W. 2d 720 (1928) (partner's lien recognaized in favor of
a bank which had made loan to partnership so as to permit bank to garnishee
funds in hands of warehouse company).
n It seems clear that, under Section 25 (2) (c), aY. lsSTAT. 362.270(2)
ce) (Supp. 1954), levy of execution by a separate creditor as in the Coufhman
case, or suing out of garnishment process as in Springfeld Fire & Marine Insurance
Company v. Huntington National Bank, supra note 179, are outlawed by the Act;
but it is not so clear as to the effect of assignments by partners where all consent,
in light of the statement in Section 25(m) (b), Ky. R~v. STAT. 62.270(2) (b)
(Supp. 1954), that a partner's right in specific partnership property is not assign-
able except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in the
same property," and the further provision in Section 25(2) (a), Ky. lEV. STAT.
362.270(2) (a) (Supp. 1954), that a partner has no rght to possess specific
partnership p roperty for othr than partnership purposes without the consent of
his partners." This seems to leave open transfers of the character involved in the
Jones case, except as they might be condemned under the law of fraudulent con-
veyances.0 tThe Act, Section 29; K(. )EV. STAT. 362.290 (Supp. 1954).
in The Act, Section 30; K(). Ky.-V. STAT. 362.295 (Supp. 1954).
a Commissioners" Note to Section 29, 7 U.L.A. 165 (1949).
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This care in defining the term "dissolution" and in distinguish-
ing it from "termination" and "winding up" was thought neces-
sary in view of the existing confusion in the use of the term by
the legal profession.8 The Kentucky court has said, for example,
that, "In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, a
partnership is dissolved by death of one of the partners",185 thus
leaving the inference that the parties may by agreement prevent
"dissolution" from occurring. This takes on added significance
when it is realized that partnership agreements frequently do
contain express provisions looking toward a continuation of the
business after death or withdrawal of a member. It may be
provided, for example, that in case of the death or withdrawal
of a member, the surviving or remaining partners shall have the
right to purchase the deceased or retiring partner's interest.86
Provision may be made that, on the death of one of the partners,
his interest in the partnership shall become the property of the
other partners,-8 or that in the event of the death of any partner,
his interest shall remain in the partnership for a certain length of
time.188
Agreements of this nature serve to insulate the partnership
from the liquidation process, which is otherwise considered the
normal incident following death or withdrawal of a member, and
enable the surviving or remaining partners to continue the busi-
ness without disruption. The business unit is thus left undis-
turbed, and going concern values are preserved. Nevertheless, a
change in the personnel of the business brings into play certain
legal principles, to be hereafter considered, which operate
whether or not the business is continued from the economic stand-
181 Ibid.
Snead's Executrix v. Jenkins, 225 Ky. 832, 835, 10 S.W. 2d 282, 284
(1928).
" See, e.g., the agreements in Baker v. Wide's Exr, 229 Ky. 414, 185 S.W.
2d 699 (1945); Lockwood's Trustee v. Lockwood, 250 Ky. 262, 62 S.W. 2d 1053
(1933).
"s See More v. Carnes, 309 Ky. 41, 214 S.W. 2d 984 (1948) which contains
an excellent discussion of the validity of such a provision in a partnership agree-
ment where coupled with a life insurance feature whereby insurance was to be
taken out on the lives of the partners (premiums to be paid by the partnership)
so as to provide a fund with which to compensate the widow or estate of the de-
cesed partner for his interest. This was held not to be "testamentary" in nature.
to be supported by sufficient consideration (mutual promises of the parties), and
not voided because of the fact that, at the time of death of one of the partners,
the deceased partner's half interest which went to the surviving partner was more
than twice the value of the life insurance.
" See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 294 Ky. 793, 172 S.W. 2d 595 (1942).
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point. These principles are predicated on the assumption that
an old business has ceased and a new business has begun. Legally
speaking, therefore, it seems appropriate to consider the old firm
as "dissolved" and a new firm as taking its place. The Act so
provides.
2. Causes of Dissolution.
The causes of dissolution are set forth in Section 31 of the
Act' 89 and will be found to follow closely the pattern set at
common law. One important clarification, however, has been
achieved by the Act. While it was agreed at common law that
in a partnership at will, any partner had the power, as well as
the right, to dissolve the partnership at any time, 9 ' there was not
complete agreement as to whether in a partnership for a definite
term or particular undertaking, a partner had the power to dis-
solve the partnership before the expiration of the stipulated term
or the accomplishment of the particular undertaking.'9 ' Although
the English cases and the English Partnership Act have taken the
view that no power exists on the part of a partner to dissolve the
partnership in such a case, the majority of the courts in this
country have adopted the position that there is "no such thing
as an 'indissoluble' partnership," 92 and that accordingly the
partner has the power to dissolve, whatever his right to do so
may be.9 3 The Act recognizes this American view by providing
that dissolution may be caused in contravention of the agreement
between the partners " by the express will of any partner at any
time." 94 The Act also recognizes, however, that this is a wrong-
ful action by the partner causing the dissolution and therefore
gives to the other partners a right against him to damages for
breach of the agreement. 9 5 Furthermore, the Act seeks to protect
Ky. REv. STAT. 362.800 (Supp. 1954).
See Johnson v. Jackson, 130 Ky. 751, 755, 114 S.W. 260, 261-262 (1908).
In Lockridge v. Fulkerson, 267 Ky. 70, 100 S.W. 2d 815 (1936) it was held a part-
nership was dissolved when one partner took charge of and removed the stock
and a liances of the partnership to a new location where he set up business for
himsef. Accord, Moore v. Malis, 292 Ky. 106, 166 S.W. 2d 52 (1942). See also
Golden v. Kirtley, 268 S.W. 2d 934 (Ky. 1954).
"' Partners may, of course, dissolve their partnership by mutual consent. See
Townsend v. Freeman Co. v. Tabor, 190 Ky. 521, 228 S.W. 6 (1921); Axton v.
Kentucky Bottlers Supply Company, 159 Ky. 51, 166 S.W. 776 (1914).
'-Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 513, 587, 10 Am. Dec. 286, 294
(1822).
CRANE, PuaRTNERS=m' sec. 75 (2d ed. 1952).
The Act, Section 31(2); Ky. Rv. STAT. 862.300(2) (Supi. 1954).
"The Act, Section 38(2) (a) (II); Ky. REv. STAT. 862.835(2) (a) (II)
(Supp. 1954).
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the interests of the innocent partners in the business by permit-
ting them, if they so desire, to purchase the interest of the wrong-
doing partner and continue the business in the same name,
either by themselves or jointly with others, during the agreed
term for the partnership. 9 '
The Act preserves the "events" which at common law were
said to bring about dissolution automatically, such as illegality,
death of a partner, or bankruptcy of a partner.1"' It also recog-
nizes that dissolution may be brought about by decree of a
court, 98 an entirely separate section being devoted to this method
of dissolution. 9 The established common law grounds for a
decree of dissolution are there set forth, such as insanity, in-
capacity, misconduct, and impossibility of success, as well as
when, "Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable."
The common law also permitted a party to rescind a partner-
ship agreement where he had been induced to enter into such
agreement by fraudulent representations. -0 0 The Act contains a
special section which embodies this right of rescission and which
deals comprehensively with the rights of the defrauded party
under such circumstances.2° '
8. New Obligations-Notice of Dissolution.
When a partner withdraws and retires from an existing part-
nership, this in theory relieves him from any future obligations
incurred by those who continue the business. Nevertheless the
fact remains that those dealing with the business may not know,
or have any reason to suspect, that he has retired as a partner,
and as to them justice and fairness calls for the giving of some
sort of notice by the retiring partner so as to prevent them from
being misled.20 2 Likewise, when a partner dies, it is said that the
surviving partner has no right to enter into any contract which
would bind the firm or prejudice the estate of the deceased
""The Act, Section 88(2) (b); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.335(2) (b) (Supp. 1954).
The rights of the wrongdoing partner are set out in Section 38(2) (c); Ky. REv.
STAT. 362.335(2) (c) (Supp. 1954).
"IThe Act, Section 31(3), (4), and (5); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.300(3), (4),
and (5) (Supp. 1954).
aThe Act, Section 31(6); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.300(6) (Supp. 1954).
"The Act, Section 32; Ky. RFv. STAT. 362.305 (Supp. 1954).
Hynes v. Stewart & Owens, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 429 (1850).
""The Act, Section 37; Ky. REv. STAT. 362.340 (Supp. 1954).
See Reid-Murdock Company v. Model Meat & Grocery Company, 204 Ky.
795, 798, 265 S.W. 322, 323 (1924).
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partner except such contracts as are necessary in settling the
affairs of the partnership." 3 New contracts, however, may actu-
ally be entered into, and the question as to the need for notice
to third parties again arises.
The common law recognized the need for notice in the first
of the situations mentioned involving the retiring partner,20 4 but
took the position that where dissolution occurred through death
of a partner, no notice was required. 20 5 This attitude in cases of
death seems to have been based on the somewhat dubious as-
sumption that such an event by its very nature would be ac-
companied by sufficient publicity of its occurrence. 200 The exemp-
tion from the requirement of notice was also extended, for the
same reason, to other events bringing about dissolution by opera-
tion of law such as bankruptcy, illegality, and dissolution by
decree of court. 0 7 Under the Act, notice seems to be required in
all cases except those where the partnership is dissolved because
of illegality and where, in the case of bankruptcy, the third per-
son deals with the bankrupt partner himself. 0 8 The most sig-
nificant change thus brought about from the practical standpoint
is, of course, the requirement that notice be given in the case of
dissolution by death, since this is by far the most common "event"
which brings about dissolution automatically by operation of law.
The expansion of the situations in which the giving of notice
is required also serves to focus attention on the kind of notice
which will satisfy the requirement. At common law, it was held
that as to those who had previously dealt with the firm before
dissolution actual notice must be given, 20 9 but that as to others
Snead's Executrix v. Jenkins, 225 Ky. 832, 835, 10 S.W. 2d 282, 284(1928).
"'Booth v. Bell Grocery Company, 239 Ky. 521 (1931); Ach & Co. v. Barnes
& Co., 107 Ky. 219 (1899).
See Bass Dry Goods Co. v. Granite City Mfg. Co., 116 Ga. 176, 42 S.E.
415 (1902).
'See MECMM, P.AaRvTNmns sec. 388 (2d ed. 1920).
=r Ibid.
' The Act, Section 35(3) (a) and (b); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.320(3) (a)
and (b); CRA , PxANansm sec. 81 at 438 (2d ed. 1952).
'Notice is defined in Section 3(2) of the Act as follows:
"A person has 'notice' of a fact within the meaning of this Act when the per-
son who claims the benefit of the notice:(a) States the fact to such person; or
(b) Delivers through the mail, or by other means of communication, a writ-
ten statement of the fact to such person or to a proper person at his place of busi-
ness or residence."
Ky. REv. STAT. 362.160 (Supp. 1954).
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who may have known of the firm but not dealt with it a general
public notice would be sufficient.2 10 The usual and best method
of giving such public notice was said to be by publication in a
newspaper published in the locality where the business of the
partnership had been conducted, although other ways affording
a reasonable opportunity of knowing the facts would also suf-
fice.2
11
The Act observes the same distinction between the two groups
entitled to notice but the provisions are more tightly drawn.
The need for actual notice is limited to those persons who "Had
extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution",- thus
clarifying the ambiguity present in the common law language as
to those who are to be considered "former dealers."2 3 As to
those who "had not so extended credit," but "had nevertheless
known of the partnership prior to dissolution," the Act specific-
ally requires the notice to be by publication in a newspaper,
thus removing the possibility of any other kind of reasonable
notice sufficing.214 In Gaar v. Huggins & Bro.,2 1 5 the Kentucky
court held that a retiring partner is not required to give notice to
those who for the first time deal with the firm after dissolution
takes place. If the court by this meant to hold that no notice was
necessary even though the third party may have known of the
existence of the firm, as seems possible under the facts, the
" MECHEM, PARTNERSHn= sec. 393 (2d ed. 1920).
'Bowman & Cockrel v. Ed. Blanton & Co., 141 Ky. 407, 411, 132 S.W. 1041,
1042 (1911).
'The Act, Section 35(1) (b) (I); Ky. Rvv. STAT. 362.320(1) (b) (I)
(Supp. 1954).
- E.g., in Lieb & Son v. Craddock, 87 Ky. 525, 9 S.W. 838 (1888), the court
held actual notice to be required where the plaintiffs alleged they knew a retired
partner was a member and had sold the firm goods before his withdrawal. It was
not alleged, nor did the court consider, whether the goods had been sold on credit.
On the other hand in R. C. Poage Milling Company v. Joseph Howard & Company,
227 Ky. 353, 355, 13 S.W. 2d 266 (1929), the court said, quoting from 30 Cyc.
671: "Those who have had dealings with and given credit to the partnership dur-
ing its existence are entitled to personal or actual notice of its dissolution." Most
of the cases in which the general rule has been applied seem to have actually in-
volved some sort of credit dealing even though the court may not have made any
point of this in their opinion. In addition to the cases already referred to, see
Booth v. Bell Grocery Company, 239 Ky. 521, 39 S.W. 2d 984 (1931); Reid-
Murdock & Company v. Model Meat & Grocery Company, 204 Ky. 795, 265 S.W.
322 (1924); Pace v. Claffin & Co., 8 Ky. Opin. 706 (1874); Daniels v. Bayles, 7
Ky. Opin. 264 (1873); Fleming v. Martin, 3 Ky. Opin. 701 (1868). Compare,
Middleton v. Francis, 257 Ky. 42, 77 S.W. 2d 425 (1934) (tort case).
"The Act, Section 35(1) (b) (I); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.320(1) (b) (R)
(Supp. 1954).
75 Ky. (12 Bush) 259 (1876).
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decision calls for modification under the Act since public notice
at least would be required in such case.2
It has long been accepted that the requirement of notice is
removed if the third person has knowledge of the dissolution. It
has not been altogether clear, however, just what constitutes
knowledge. The Act states that, "A person has 'knowledge' of a
fact within the meaning of this act not only when he has actual
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such other
facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith."2 17 This definition
is comparable to a similar provision applicable to holders in due
course in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,218 where it is
understood as establishing, in general, a subjective test of "hon-
esty" rather than an objective test of "diligence." 9 A like in-
terpretation would seem appropriate in construing the Uniform
Partnership Act, and if adopted would reject the notion that it is
sufficient to find merely that the person knew enough facts to put
a reasonable person in his position on inquiry.220 On the other
hand, the "bad faith" test of the Act would seem to be consistent
with the statement of the Kentucky court in Bowman & Cockrel
v. Ed. Blanton & Co.,12 that where a long time has elapsed since
the dissolution, and in the transaction with the former partner
matters are brought to the third party's attention which would
" The court cited in support of its general rule the earlier Kentucky case of
Kennedy v. Bohannon, 50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.) 119 (1850) in which the court said
at 120: "So where an ostensible partner retires from the firm, he will still remain
liable for the contracts of the firm as to all persons who have previously dealt with
the firm and have no notice of his retirement. But as to persons who have had
no previous dealings with the firm, and no knowledge who are Or have been part-
ners, a different rule may prevail." (Emphasis supplied)
"'The Act, Section 3(1); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.160(1) (Supp. 1954).
" "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have
had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that
his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." Ky. BEv. STAT. 356.056
(1953). See BmrroN, BiLrs AND NoTs sec. 100 (1943).
oSee, however, the interpretation put upon this provision by the Michigan
court in McIntosh v. Detroit Savings Bank, 247 Mich. 10, 225 N.W. 628 (1929).
Nebraska, in order to remove all doubts as to the meaning of "knowledge", added
a clause to Section 3(1) so as to make the section read: "A person has 'knowledge'
of a fact, within the meaning of this act, not only when he has actual knowledge
thereof and when he has knowledge of such other facts as in the circumstances
show bad faith, but also when he has knowledge, or under the circumstances.
should have had knowledge, of such facts as give rise to a duty of inquiry, which
inquiry, if made, would have disclosed the facts to him." NEB. REv. STAT. 67-303
(1943). See Williams, The Uniform Partnership Act Comes To Nebraska, 22
NEB. L. REV. 215, 218 (1943).
141 Ky. 407, 411, 132 S.W. 1041, 1043 (1911).
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indicate that the affairs of the partnership are in a state of liquida-
tion and final settlement, the jury may infer knowledge of the
dissolution from such circumstances.
The Act also takes cognizance of the possibility that the
partners themselves may not always know that dissolution has
occurred and that a partner may incur liabilities or expenses after
dissolution for which he should be allowed contribution. It is
therefore provided in Section 34222 that where dissolution is
caused by the act of any partner, a right of contribution will exist
unless the partner acting for the partnership had knowledge of
the dissolution, and that where dissolution is caused by the death
or bankruptcy of a partner, contribution is available unless the
partner acting for the partnership had knowledge or notice of
the death or bankruptcy. This latter requirement of notice in the
case of death or bankruptcy admittedly changes existing com-
mon law which took the position that every person, including the
partners themselves, would be assumed to have notice of such
facts.223
4. Existing Obligations.
Whatever the complications may have been as to new firm
obligations, it was well settled at common law that dissolution
of itself had no effect on existing firm obligations.22 Indeed, in
Henry v. Seiberling Rubber Company,225 the Kentucky court en-
forced this rule against a retired partner even as to merchandise
delivered after the partner had withdrawn and at a time when
it was established the creditor knew this fact, since the original
contract under which the deliveries were made had been executed
at a time when the retired partner was still a member of the
partnership. The Act does not disturb this basic conception as
to existing obligations.
Frequently, however, partners continuing a business agree
with the retiring member to pay all partnership debts and relieve
him from any further responsibility in consideration of their
purchase of his interest. This is held to create the relationship
-Ky. REv. STAT. 362.315 (Supp. 1954).
= Commissioners Note to Section 34, 7 U.L.A. 190, 191 (1949).
CRNs, PARTNEmassn sec. 79 (2d ed. 1952). Section 36(1) of the Act is in
accord. Ky. REv. STAT. 362.325 (Supp. 1954).
=265 Ky. 241, 96 S.W. 2d 590 (1936).
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of principal and surety between the parties, the continuing
partners becoming the principal debtors on the obligations and
the retiring partner a surety for their payment.226 The common
law, however, could not agree on the extent to which creditors
were required, on receiving knowledge of the agreement, to
observe this principal-surety relationship between the parties.
In the Seiberling Rubber Company case, the Kentucky court
said that the company, as creditor, would not be affected by such
an agreement unless it assented or agreed to it.227 The Uniform
Partnership Act modifies this general rule by providing in Section
36(3)228 that, "Where a person agrees to assume the existing
obligations of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose obliga-
tions have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability to
any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement,
consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment
of such obligations." Thus, to a certain extent at least, the creditor
is required to recognize the principal-surety relation thereby cre-
ated. 9 In adopting this view, the Act made the choice in favor
of what appears to be the majority view under the general law of
suretyship at common law.230
The Act provides that, "The individual property of a deceased
partner shall be liable for all obligations of the partnership in-
curred while he was a partner, but subject to the prior payment
of his separate debts."231 This provision has particular significance
with reference to partnership contract obligations. Such obliga-
tions, being joint in nature, fell within the common law rule that
on death of a joint obligor the obligation devolved upon the
surviving obligors. 32 The creditor thus had no claim he could
assert against the estate of the deceased obligor. This proved
particularly harsh where the remaining obligors were insolvent
or for other reasons could not be reached to satisfy the claim.
Courts of equity have long given relief from the operation of this
rule in the case of partnership obligations, 33 and there are stat-
utes in many states, including Kentucky, which provide for the
22 Id. at 245, 96 S.W. 2d at 592.
- Ibid.
='Ky. R v. STAT. 362.325(3) (Supp. 1954).
= Lenger v. Hulst, 259 Mich. 640, 244 N.W. 187 (1932).
See CRANE, PARTNERSHnp sec. 79 (2d ed. 1952).
r'The Act, Section 36(4); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.325(4) (Supp. 1954).
'2 WILLSTON, CoNTRAcTs sec. 344 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
'Ibid. See also 4 CoRBN, CoNTuAcTs sec. 930 (1950).
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survival of joint obligations.2 4 Thus, in one way or another, a
remedy has been made available against the deceased obligor's
estate, and this is confirmed by the above provision of the Act.
It will be found, however, that local law differs somewhat as to
whether the remedy is an independent one against the estate of
the deceased partner, or whether the creditor must first exhaust
his remedies against the partnership assets and the surviving
partners. 235 The Act does not purport to affect local procedure
in this respect. In Kentucky, by statute, it is provided that, in the
case of death of a joint obligor or obligors, the action may be
brought against any or all of the survivors in conjunction with
the representatives of all or any of the decedents or against only
the representatives of the decedents or any of them.230 Thus it
would seem that provision is made for a direct and independent
suit against the estate of a deceased partner with no requirements
as to relief having been first sought against the survivors.
5. Continuance of Business Without Liquidation - Creditor's
Rights.
Although winding up and liquidation are frequently referred
to as the normal results of dissolution, this, as already pointed
out, by no means necessarily follows. There are numerous oc-
casions in which a partnership business will continue without
interruption even though there is a change in the membership.
Where one partner withdraws from membership it is most likely
to be under conditions whereby the remaining members continue
to operate the business either themselves or in conjunction with
one who buys the interest of the retiring member. If one of the
partners dies, the surviving partners will frequently continue the
business by purchase of the deceased partner's interest, or other-
wise, pursuant to authority contained in the partnership articles.
A new partner may be admitted by consent into an existing
partnership.23 7 In all these situations, and others, where the busi-
'Ky. REv. STAT. 412.010 (1953); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTnAcTs sec. 336 (Rev.
Ed. 1936).
BUBDICIC, PARTNERSH= 317 (3d ed. 1917); MEcHm, PAITNmEHPm see.
411 (2d ed. 1920); see Note, 61 A.L.R. 1410, 1419 (1929).
=Ky. rV. STAT. 411.180 (1953).
W' hile it seems clear this should involve the legal incident of dissolution,
technically it does not come within the definition contained in Section 29 of the
Act, Ky. REv. STAT. 362.290 (Supp. 1954), which defines dissolution in such man-
ner as to require that an existing member cease to be associated in the partner-
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ness continues as an economic unit, there exists a possible clash
between creditors of the old and new firms if both groups should
later seek to reach the firm property in satisfaction of their claims.
At common law, the new firm was not liable for the debts of
the old firm unless the new firm assumed such liability. This
meant that the old firm creditors lost their right to reach firm
property except as they might be able to establish that the trans-
fer of assets from the old to the new firm amounted to a fraudulent
conveyance.238 If no grounds existed for treating the transfer
as a fraudulent conveyance, the result was that the new firm
creditors could absorb all the partnership assets to the exclusion
of the old firm creditors. On the other hand, we are told that
courts in their anxiety to protect the old firm creditors sometimes
found the transfer to be a fraudulent conveyance even though
no fraud was intended, with the result that the old firm creditors
gained priority in such assets to the exclusion of the new firm
creditors.239 In either circumstance, hardship and inequity re-
sulted to one or the other of the two groups of creditors.240
The Uniform Partnership Act seeks to remove this injustice
by providing in Section 41241 that where existing members of a
partnership continue the business, either with or without the ad-
dition of new members, the creditors of the first partnership are
to be treated also as creditors of the partnership continuing the
business. Thus, all creditors, both old and new, are put on a
parity as to firm property.242 However, in the situation where
all the partners in an existing partnership sell the business to
one or more third persons, the creditors of the old firm are not
ship. The problem of interpretation thereby presented is discussed in Karesh,
Partnership Law And The Uniform Partnership Act In South Carolina, 4 So. CAR.
L. Q. 64, 111-112 (1951).CANE, PARTNERSHIP sec. 88 (2d ed. 1952).
Commissioners' Note to Section 41, 7 U.L.A. 229-230 (1949); Lewis, The
Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YAT-R L. ). 617, 635-636 (1915).
"A separate Uniform Act dealing generally with the subject of fradulent
conveyances covers this subject as applied to partnerships. See UNIFoBm FRAUTDU-
LENT CoNVEYANCES ACr, 9A U.L.A. 42 (1951). It was for this reason that the
decision was made to omit the subject matter of fraudulent conveyances from the
Uniform Partnership Act. See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply, 29
HAnv. L. REV. 291, 296-298 (1916).
" Ky. REV. STAT. 362.350 (Supp. 1954). There is an error in the heading of
this section in the Kentucky statute. The word "Inability" should read "Liability".
2'2 CRANE, PARTEanssHp sec. 88 (2d ed. 1952). In MEcHEm, PAn TRasmap
sec. 462 (2d ed. 1920) it is said: "The Uniform Partnership Act proposes, in gen-
eral, to regard all of the creditors at the various stages as creditors of the business
at any stage, where the business is in fact continuous notwithstanding the changes
in the personnel of the members."
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given the status of creditors of the person or partnership con-
tinuing the business unless there exists a promise by such person
or persons to pay the old firm debts.243 Although the assumption
agreement in such case, as in other cases, would take care of the
individual liability of those continuing the business, the Act
makes it clear that the partnership assets are also committed to
such liability. 44
The problem presented by the incoming partner needs special
mention since it is given separate treatment in Section 17 of the
Act.245 It is there provided that, "A person admitted as a partner
into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the
partnership arising before his admission as though he had been
a partner when such obligations were incurred, except that the
liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership property." The
wording of this provision may seem a bit puzzling to the un-
initiated. It is fundamental, of course, that an incoming partner
is not liable merely by virtue of becoming a member for debts
contracted before his entrance into the partnership.4 6 However,
he may, and frequently does, promise to answer for these debts
as part of the consideration for his acquiring an interest in the
partnership.247 In such case, his personal liability to old firm
creditors under the third party beneficiary doctrine is clear,
4
"The Act, Section 41(4); Ky. REv. STAT. 862.350(4) (Supp. 1954). This
provision has particular importance where a partnership is incorporated. There
exists a difference of opinion whether a promise by the corporation to pay existing
liabilities of the partnership is to be inplied from the nature of the transaction
or whether an express promise must be found for this result to follow. Compare
Rodgers v. Lincoln Hospital, 289 Mich. 329, 214 N.W. 88 (1927) (requiring an
express assumption), with Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 56 N.E. 875 (1900)
(implied in fact from the circumstances). Since the Act aids the old firm creditors
in such cases only where a promise exists, the cases in any particular iurisdiction
on whether a promise is to be implied in fact still retain their significance. In
Sowards Insurance Agency v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Insurance Company,
Receiver, 243 Ky. 224, 47 S.W. 2d 1043 (1932) where an insurance agency was
operated under the same name as an old firm which had become deeply involved
financially but which was composed of different persons, it was held the two firms
were distinct entities and the new firm was not liable for the old agencies debts to
the insurance company.
'"See Commissioners' Note to Section 41, 7 U.L.A. 229 (1949).
"Ky. REv. STAT. 362.280 (Supp. 1954).
"Z6Wolff v. Madden, 6 Wash. 514, 33 Pac. 975 (1893). See also Meador v.
Hughes, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 652 (1879); Elken v. Green, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 612
(1878).
" See CAN, PAR RaSHIm see. 88 (2d ed. 1952).
"Wood v. Macafee, 172 N. Y. Supp. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1918). But cf. Francis
v. Smith, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 121 (1863) (creditor held entitled to sue incoming
partner by way of substitution to retiring partner on agreement of incoming part-
ner to save harmless retiring partner on debts of the firm where retiring partner
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but doubt still remains as to the rights of the old firm creditors
in the partnership assets, which is intensified if there is no as-
sumption agreement. Section 17 seeks to clarify this by treating
the interest of the incoming partner in the partnership property
as committed to old firm creditors as well as to those becoming
such subsequent to his admission. This, when coupled with the
provisions of Section 41,249 makes certain that the old firm
creditors will be placed on a parity with those of the new firm 50
6. Priorities In Liquidation.
When a business is liquidated after dissolution, there will in-
evitably arise the important question as to the proper order to
follow in the distribution of the proceeds derived from sale and
disposition of the partnership property. Section 40 of the Act25'
contains a series of rules which are to be followed in the absence
of agreement of the parties to the contrary. The following priori-
ties are set up for the payment of the liabilities of the partner-
ship: (1) those owing to creditors other than partners, (2) those
owing to partners other than for capital and profits, 25 2 (8) those
owing to partners in respect to capital, 55 and (4) those owing to
partners in respect to profits. These priorities are in line with
those recognized and applied at common law. 4
Where the partnership has operated at a loss, the Act places
each partner under a duty to contribute toward the loss in the
same ratio in which he shares profits, and this duty is made ap-
plicable to capital losses as well as those involving outside
creditors.2 55 In Meadows v. Mocquot,256 the Kentucky court re-
fused to apply this rule as to capital losses in a case where one
was before court and consented thereto); Owsley v. Williams, 8 Ky. Opin. 242(1874) (creditor must make the retiring partner a party since his rights are
"derived" through him).
" See note 238 supra.
See Commissioners' Note to Section 17, 7 U.L.A. 100 (1949).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.345 (Supp. 1954).
'This would include loans and advancements to the partnership over and
above capital contributions. Under Section 18(c) of the Act interest must be paid
on any such payments or advancements from the date of the payment or advance,
unless otherwise agreed. Ky. REv. STAT. 362.235(3) (Supp. 1954).
'Under Section 18(d) of the Act, there is no right to interest on capital
contributions except from the date when repayment should be made, unless other-
wise agreed. Ky. BEy. STAT. 362.235(4) (Supp. 1954).
" See MECHEM, PARTNERsHmp sec. 469 (2d ed. 1920).
'The Act, Section 40(d) and 18(e); Ky. REv. STAT. 362.345(4) and
362.235(1) (Supp. 1954).
110 Ky. 220, 61 S.W. 28 (1901).
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partner contributed all the money necessary to carry on the
business, and the other partner furnished only his labor in run-
ning the business, the profits, if any, to be shared equally. The
theory of the court seemed to be that under such an arrange-
ment the partner contributing the capital will be considered as
contributing its use merely and therefore not entitled to recover
from his copartner for the loss of any part of the money so con-
tributed by him for the use of the firm.257 "It may be answered",
says Professor Crane in his book on the law of partnership, "that
such a partnership, in which some partners contribute nothing to
capital, is an unusual situation in a partnership where a sub-
stantial amount of capital is employed. In entering into an as-
sociation with unusual features, the associates should foresee that
application of the usual rules may bring about unusual results,
and take advantage of their power to vary by agreement the rules
which in the absence of- agreement are implied."258 While, there-
fore, the Act would not directly affect the decision of the court
in the Meadows case, it does provide an opportunity for re-
-examination of its soundness as a legal principle.
Special rules come into play when a partnership estate and
the estate of the individual partners are in the hands of a court
for administration and settlement. Claims of individual creditors
and partnership creditors are then likely to compete for recogni-
tion in the distribution of the respective estates. Partnership
creditors have, of course, the right to satisfaction of their claims
not only out of partnership assets but also out of the estates of
the individual partners. They thus have two sources or funds
from which to receive payment. Separate creditors of the part-
ners, on the other hand, have only the individual estate of their
debtor to rely upon. While it is true they could reach the
debtor's interest in the partnership property at common law, this
interest, as previously indicated, was subject to the prior payment
of partnership debts. The individual creditors, therefore, found
themselves subordinated to partnership creditors in partnership
'n That only the use of the money was being contributed seemed to follow,
thought the court, from the fact that it was one of the conditions of the partner-
ship that, before any division of profits could be had, all of the money contributed
by the partner was to be restored to him. This, however, would follow in any caseunder the accepted rules for distribution of assets of a dissolved partnership. _y CdT , PATNBsH sec. 65 at 346 (2d ed. 1952). See also Note, 24
COL. L. BEv. 508 (1924).
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assets. Equity, in its pursuit of "equality" conceived that it should
follow that separate creditors have a like priority in individual
assets. As said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Rodgers v.
Meranda,25 9 a leading case on the subject, "The preference, there-
fore, of the individual creditors of a partner in the distribution of
his separate estate, results, as a principle of equity, from the
preference of partnership creditors in the partnership funds, and
their advantages in having different funds to resort to, while the
individual creditors have but the one."20 This rule of correlative
priority was adopted by the majority of the states at common
law,21 and is specifically recognized and adopted in Section 40 (h)
of the Uniform Partnership Act.2 2
Kentucky, at common law, applied a modified version of this
rule, and Kentucky law has to this extent been changed by the
Act. In Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Keizer,263 the court recog-
nized that the individual creditor had a claim to priority in the
individual estate "coextensively with his privation" in being re-
stricted to this one fund when the partnership creditor had a
right to look to two funds. So, the court said, the true rule should
be that "if partnership creditors exhaust the partnership estate
without full payment, the individual creditors have the reciprocal
right to make as much of their debt out of the individual estate,
and, if, then, any individual property should remain undisposed
of, it shall be distributed pari passu among all the creditors, re-
gardless of class."" 4 In other words, as soon as individual creditors
received a return out of individual property which equalled the
return received by the partnership creditors out of partnership
property, both groups should share together in the remainder.26 5
Actually, there seems to have been a good bit of "equity" in
this Kentucky doctrine when one considers that partnership
creditors have a right to look to the individual property of the
partners as well as the partnership property for settlement of
=7 Ohio St. 179 (1857).
'0 Id. at 184-185.
'CaANE, PA EmERHn sec. 94 (2d ed. 1952).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.845(8) (Supp. 1954).
=63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 169 (1865).
Id. at 172.
'The rule of the Keizer case was recognized and applied in Whitehead v.
Chadwell's Admr, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 432 (1866), and in Hill v. Cornwall & Bro's.
Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S.W. 540 (1894).
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their claims. 0 6 Indeed, in theory, it is arguable that the "equities"
are all against any rule of correlative priority and that partner-
ship creditors should share from the outset along with individual
creditors in the individual assets. 0 Nevertheless, the matter has
been settled in favor of the complete, correlative priority rule by
the Uniform Partnership Act. This at least has the advantage of
making, and keeping, the rule consistent with that used in the
administration of insolvent estates in bankruptcy.
It has generally been agreed that the partnership creditor may
avoid the operation of the correlative priority rule by obtaining
the separate obligation of the individual members as well as their
joint liability as members of the firm, thus enabling the partner-
ship creditor to make double proof.28 This possibility was re-
jected, however, by the Kentucky court in Fayette National Bank
of Lexington v. Kenney's assignee."9 In that case two members
of a firm signed their individual names to a firm note below the
name of the firm. Later, the two members executed assignments
for the benefit of their creditors, which was followed by a like
assignment by the firm. The holders of the notes received a 31 per
cent dividend out of the partnership assets. They then sought a pro
rata dividend out of the individual estate of Kenney, one of the
members, on the theory that the effect of requiring the individual
signatures of the members on the note was to create both a
partnership and an individual liability. The court rejected this
contention saying that one partner will not be allowed, by becom-
ing a surety for a firm debt, on which he is already liable in-
dividually anyway, to give the partnership creditors all the firm
assets and in addition the same share in the individual estate of
the partners as his individual creditors receive in the distribution.
Double proof was, therefore, not allowed, and the general rule as
to marshalling was deemed to apply, which meant that the
holders of the notes could take nothing from Kenney's individual
assets until the individual creditors had received as great a
A partnership creditor may, for example, secure a lien on the individual
property of a partner pursuant to judgment against the partners. The lien thus
obtained will be recognized even in equity should a later insolvency proceeding
occur. Meech v. Allen, 17 N. Y. 300 (1858). Section 40(h) of the Act likewise
preserves the rights of lien creditors. Ky. REv. STAT. 362.345(8) (Supp. 1954).
' See the discussion in Robinson v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268, 87 Atl. 879
(1913).
CRANE, P.aRTNaRsmr see. 94 (2d ed. 1952).
-'79 Ky. 133 (1880).
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dividend as had been paid the holders of the notes out of the
firm assets. As the matter of double proof is not dealt with in the
Uniform Partnership Act, decisions such as rendered by the Ken-
tucky court in this case would appear to be left undisturbed what-
ever criticism may otherwise be directed at them.70
There exists some case authority in this country to the effect
that the rule of absolute priority of separate creditors does not
apply where there are no partnership assets available with which
to satisfy partnership creditors and that in such case the two
groups of creditors should be allowed to come in together to
share in the assets of the individual estate.27  This exception to
the general rule has been rejected by the United States Supreme
Court under the Bankruptcy Act, 72 and the Uniform Partnership
Act would appear to dictate its rejection since no exception of
any kind is recognized in Section 40(i) 273 which governs the
relative priorities of claims in the estate of an insolvent partner.
It there states that the claims against his separate property shall
rank in the following order: (1) those owing to separate creditors,
(2) those owing to partnership creditors, and (3) those owing
to partners by way of contribution.
It is to be observed that this priority precludes a copartner
from setting up a claim arising out of partnership matters, and
for which he is due contribution, in competition with the out-
side creditors of the insolvent partner. On the other hand, it does
permit such copartner to compete with the outside creditors of
the insolvent partner on a claim arising out of matters discon-
nected with and unrelated to the partnership business, 275 a privi-
lege which it appears was not always extended by common law
cases in this country.7 6 Under the Act, the copartner would him-
self be considered an outside creditor as to such a claim, which
seems logically correct. Moreover, the aim and purpose of the
I See Note, 15 Ky. L. J. 44 (1926). A general review and summary of Ken-
tucky law as to the right of a secured creditor to make double proof will be found
in Banco Kentucky Co.'s Receiver v. National Bank of Kentucky's Receiver, 281
Ky. 784, 818-820, 137 S.W. 2d 357, 375 (1939).
-" See CRANE, PARTNEnsHP see. 94 at 516 (2d ed. 1952).
1 Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank of Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Bank,
240 U.S. 498 (1916).
mKy. REv. STAT. 362.845(9) (Supp. 1954).
See CRANE, PAR ansmp sec. 94 n. 84 (2d ed. 1952).
Id. at p. 522. This is also confirmed in Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act
-A Reply, 29 HAnv. L. REv. 291, 307 (1916).
"'See MEcma, PAnrNEnsp sec. 451 (2d ed. 1920).
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common law, as well as the Act, was, and is, to prevent a debtor
from competing with his own creditors, a danger which becomes
immediately apparent where the firm is indebted to a partner and
he or his separate creditors seek to share with partnership creditors
in the firm property,277 or where a partner is indebted to the
firm and the firm seeks to share with the partner's separate
creditors in the distribution of the partner's individual estate.278
Such competition is absent, however, on non-partnership claims
between partners. It has been said that, in this respect, the Act
"sharpens the distinction between claims related and those not
related to the firm business."279
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion, in addition to pro-
viding a general introduction to the Uniform Partnership Act, will
have served to emphasize the point made at the outset, that the
Act does not create a new body of principles for the law of part-
nership but on the whole seeks to unify and clarify the existing
law. This is not to say no changes have been effected in common
law principles by the Act. There are changes. It will be found,
however, that many of the changes are localized in particular
jurisdictions on particular points, resulting from the necessity
that the Act make a choice where conflicting viewpoints existed
at common law.2 80 The changes, therefore, to some extent fluctu-
ate between jurisdictions, depending on the position adopted by
any particular jurisdiction in its common law decisions. No doubt'
the biggest single change effected by the Act is that pertaining
to partnership property with its new form of co-ownership called
"tenancy in partnership." Yet even here the trail had already
been blazed by equity, and the end result will be found not too
different from that already forged by equity, although it is true
the means to that end is much more direct in the Act and much
less open to misinterpretation and misapplication along the way.
Two final matters suggest themselves. First, to what extent
=' Ibid.
"' Id. at sec. 456.
''Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law and The Uniform Partner-
ship Act, 9 OriO ST. L. J. 616, 650 (1948).
,1 It was said in the case of In re Safady, 228 Fed. 538, 540 (1915) that the
Act "is an attempt to codify the existing common law on the subject, rather than
to change that system;,but where the rules are conflicting it chooses the one sup-
posed to be the better.
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does the Act affect other forms of unincorporated business as-
sociations such as the joint stock association and the business
trust, or special kinds of "partnerships" such as the joint ad-
venture, the limited partnership or the mining partnership?
Second, to what extent does the Act affect existing partnerships
formed prior to the effective date of the Act?
As to the first question, it has been suggested that, in general,
the Act will affect other associations to the extent that they are
already deemed to be governed by the general law of partner-
ship.28' The Act itself gives some, but not much, help. It is pro-
vided in Section 6(2)282 that the Act shall apply to limited part-
nerships except in so far as the statutes relating to such partner-
ships are inconsistent. 2s3 It is also there provided that no associa-
tion formed under any other statute shall be treated as a partner-
ship under the Act unless such association would have been con-
sidered a partnership under the laws of the state prior to the
adoption of the Act. Other than for these provisions, however,
the Act is silent on the subject.
As to the second question, the answer centers around Section
4(5) of the Act2 84 which provides that the Act is not to be con-
strued so as to impair the obligations of any contract existing
when the Act went into effect, nor to affect any action or pro-
ceedings begun or right accrued before the Act took effect. Since
the partnership relation is itself founded on voluntary contract, it
might be assumed from this that the Act would have no applica-
tion whatsoever to partnerships formed prior to its effective date.
Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law and The Uniform Partner-
ship Act, 9 0mo ST. L. J. 616, 625 (1948). In Dunning, Jr. v. Gibbs, 213 Ky. 81,
280 S.W. 483 (1926) the court applied to a joint stock association the rule of
partnership law that where the power of a partner to bind his associates is limited,
the limitation is effective as to a third person who contracts with knowledge of
the limitation. Compare State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E.
2d 30 (1942) in which the court refused to apply to a business trust either the
common law principles of partnership or those set forth in the Uniform Partner-
ship Act so as to permit a dissolution of the association in violation of the pro-
visions contained in the declaration of trust.
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.175(2) (Supp. 1954).
'The Kentucky Limited Partnership statute appears in Ky. REv. STAT.
362.010 to 362.130 (1953). An excellent summary of the nature and incidents of
a mining partnership will be found in the recent case of Stephens v. Allen, 314
Ky. 769, 237 S.W. 2d 72, 24 A.L.R. 2d 1353 (1951). It has been said of the joint
adventure that "it is governed by the same principles of law" as applied to a
partnership. Jones v. Nickell, 297 Ky. 81, 83, 179 S.W. 2d 195, 196 (1944). See
also Comment, The Joint Adventure: Problem Child of Partnership, 38 CALr. L.
REv. 860 (1950).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 362.165(5) (Supp. 1954).
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No such broad interpretation, however, appears to have as yet
been given to this section, and decisions have been rendered in
other jurisdictions in which particular provisions of the Act have
been applied to partnerships already in existence.285 The mere
fact, then, that the partnership itself is the result of contract be-
tween the parties does not guarantee them complete insulation
from the application of the Act to their business. Passage of the
Act thus takes on added significance when it is realized that not
only partnerships formed in the future but also existing partner-
ships may come within its scope.
It is believed that passage of the Uniform Partnership Act in
Kentucky will prove to have been a desirable step to take, not
only because it enables Kentucky to join its sister states in fur-
thering the cause of uniformity in this area of mercantile law,
but also because it should aid in stabilizing the essential principles
of partnership law within the state, thereby improving the posi-
tion of the partnership as a desirable form of business organiza-
tion for use by the citizens of Kentucky.
See Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law and The Uniform Part-
nership Act, 9 OMo ST. L. J. 616, 628 and n. 44 (1948).
